Prioleau v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of the police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 191 Md. App. 196 - Rodriguez v. State · Smith v. State

2. “Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, it is clear that the suppression hearing court found that Detective Stach did not intend to ask Petitioner “a question on anything that has to do with illegal activity.” That factual finding was not clearly erroneous. The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether Detective Stach, based on the totality of the circumstances, knew or should have known that greeting Petitioner with the words, “What’s up, Maurice?,” would be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. From our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record, we hold that it is not reasonable to expect that those words would be likely to elicit an incriminating response.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 192 Md. App. 469 - Adams v. State

3. “We review the Circuit Court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and “consider only the facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing.” Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498 , 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007). “The factual findings of the suppression court and its conclusions regarding the credibility of testimony are accepted unless clearly erroneous.” Prioleau v. State, 411 Md. 629, 638 , 984 A.2d 851, 856 (2009) (quoting Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 82-83 , 939 A.2d 689, 697 (2008)). The foregoing notwithstanding, we “undertake our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present case.” Id. (internal citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cox v. State