¶1I respectfully dissent and would affirm both of appellant’s convictions. I emphasize that my dissent is confined to the sole issue raised by appellant in his brief, which alleges error in the trial court’s admission of certain hearsay statements.
¶2In brief, appellant contends that the trial judge erred in admitting eight statements made by the detective during the course of appellant’s more than hour long interrogation.
¶3It appears the only portion of the eight passages that specifically relate to the Second Shooting, which occurred outside the club, is found in the last statement. That statement begins, “They’re saying you came out of the club shooting-They’re saying you were shooting in the air. That’s what they are saying. That’s exactly what they are saying you did.” The remainder of this statement relates back to the Parker shooting. In my opinion, while this statement should have been excluded, its admission was harmless since it only accused appellant of shooting in the air once he left the club, and there is no question that he did fire his gun in the parking lot.
¶4*412Appellant seeks reversal solely on the basis of the trial court’s refusal to strike these eight statements from evidence. While I agree these statements were inadmissible hearsay, I would affirm both of appellant’s convictions as I find the appellant failed to establish prejudice warranting reversal. State v. Brockmeyer, 406 S.C. 324, 751 S.E.2d 645 (2013).
¶5. These are the eight statements, including the time during the interrogation at which they were made, as reproduced in appellant’s brief:
4:00-4:30 "Word is you have been identified as somebody who did some shooting yesterday.”.... "There’s a bunch of people identified you
5:25-5:39 "When we was at the Shriner’s club on May 24, [witness name] and my boyfriend [unknown name] was about to take a picture and he [Appellant] was already taking his picture with his *411gun up and we asked him what he was doing with it in there and he pointed it at us and he pointed it and he just started shooting everywhere.” (Investigator Fraser purportedly reading a statement provided by a witness.)
6:06-6:10 "There’s a lot people that saw you do it.”
7:11-7:21 “Well there’s too many people that saw you shoot it.... Everybody's saying the same thing. They confronted you about having the gun in that picture and you started shooting.”
9:58-10:13 "I’ve got statements from people that identify you as the shooter by name.... They called your name ... They wrote it in the statements, straight up.”
12:04-12:08 "But people saw you. They know you. They called your name.”
49:29 “All I have to go on is what the witnesses there said. That's it. I’ve got you with the gun. I’ve got them saying you are the one that shot.”
53:10-55:18 "They’re saying you came out of the club shooting.... They’re saying you were shooting in the air. That’s what they are saying. That's exactly what they are saying you did.... They’re saying they confronted you. They are like ’What are you doing with the gun.' That’s when you pulled out the gun and started shooting.... That's exactly what they are saying.... That's what they are saying.... You’re thinking that there's only one person saying you did it. There’s a bunch of people; they were there, they saw you and they called your name ... They saw you with the gun.”
¶6I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree that admission of Brewer’s interrogation was error. I also agree that the murder conviction should be reversed as a result of this error. However, I depart from the majority’s conclusion that admission of the interrogation was harmless as it relates to the charges of ABWIK and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.
¶7But for the solicitor’s numerous instances of burden shifting, via the interrogation tape, I would agree that the error was harmless as to the latter charges. However, the jury was repeatedly bombarded with the unconstitutional notion that Brewer had to prove that he was innocent. In my view, this created a due process structural defect in the trial. Structural defects are not subject to a harmless-error analysis regardless of the evidence presented. See State v. Rivera, 402 S.C. 225, 247, 741 S.E.2d 694, 705 (2013) (“[D]espite the strong interests upon which the harmless-error doctrine is based, there are certain constitutional rights which are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error. These are structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards and which affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” (internal quotations omitted) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). Accordingly, I would reverse all of Brewer’s convictions and remand for a new trial.