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412 F.2d 591

Docket No. 512, Docket 32625.

United States v. Piccini

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued April 15, 1969.

Decided June 27, 1969.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1969-06-27

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The instruction claimed to be privileged, however, was given by [the defendant] as an officer of the corporation, so that the privilege, if any, was that of the corporation, and may not be availed of by [the defendant].”

quoted by 1 later decision, including United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 152

Relies on Holt v. United States · Lawn v. United States · The Fisheries Products Company, Receivers of the Fisheries Products Company v. Abraham S. See & Depew, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by John Joseph Smith · Decided 1969-06-27

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently May 2000

9 federal appellate ·

7019691970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1*592William Sonenshine, Evseroff, Newman & Sonenshine, Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellant.

¶2Vincent T. McCarthy, U. S. Atty., Eastern District of New York (Louis R. Rosenthal, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

¶3Before WATERMAN, SMITH and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.

¶4J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge:

¶5The defendant, Thomas Piccini, was one of five codefendants 1 charged with knowingly and fraudulently concealing the assets of a bankrupt in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 371. He was convicted on both the substantivé and conspiracy counts after jury trial before Judge Weinstein in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and sentenced to three years in jail.

¶6On appeal the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the admissibility of certain testimony given at trial by his former attorney. He also argues that the grand jury indictment was defective because it was based on statements allegedly inadmissible under section 7a(10) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (10). We find no error and affirm.

¶7The evidence, even though largely circumstantial, was plainly sufficient. In April, 1962, Piccini invested in a New York corporation, Vanderbilt Candy and Tobacco Co., Inc. (“Vanderbilt”), a tobacco and candy distributor. Shortly thereafter Vanderbilt embarked on the classic course of bankruptcy fraud, greatly expanding its purchases on credit and selling at or below cost for cash or checks to cash which promptly disappeared, with Vanderbilt’s involuntary bankruptcy following in due course.2 As to Piccini’s actual participation in the fraud scheme, the prosecution showed that Piccini had greatly exaggerated the amount of his investment in the company in order to inflate its capital stock and construct a favorable financial statement for credit purposes. Shortly after he joined Vanderbilt, the defendant brought a friend, Harold Surofsky, into the company as a salesman, and Surofsky promptly began disposing of large quantities of merchandise at sacrifice prices. There was also the unexplained disappearance of Vanderbilt’s books and records, the nondeposit of checks and cash in Vanderbilt’s bank account, and the spectacle of merchandise trucked away immediately upon delivery. The jury could also have found *593that Piceini received some of the cash which the company had been unable to account for. Moreover, the participation of his two partners, Brander and Monda, in the scheme was fully established. The evidence was ample therefore on both the substantive and conspiracy counts.

¶8The defendant urges next that the court erred in allowing Theodore Rosenberg, attorney for Vanderbilt, to testify that Piceini owed him money for past legal services, and that Piceini had instructed him to apply the proceeds of certain corporate claims in partial reduction of this personal indebtedness. Piccini insists that these statements were made in the attorney-client context and are therefore privileged. The instruction claimed to be privileged, however, was given by Piceini as an officer of the corporation, so that the privilege, if any, was that of the corporation, and may not be availed of by Piceini.3

¶9The defendant’s principal claim appears to be that his testimony in bankruptcy proceedings was privileged and that its use against him invalidates the conviction.4 The testimony was not allowed in evidence at trial, but was before the grand jury. If the indictment were based solely on that testimony, it might be that we would have to determine whether the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 and to decide whether the privilege extends to an officer of a bankrupt corporation who is subpoenaed to testify at the first meeting of creditors.5

¶10We need not resolve this question, however, since the testimony given at the creditors’ meeting was excluded from evidence at trial, and since the indictment returned by the grand jury was not based solely on the questioned testimony. Indeed, some thirty witnesses testified before the grand jury and detailed the situation portrayed on trial.6 We will not upset a conviction founded on an indictment based on sufficient, legal and probative evidence because other evidence of doubtful admissibility was also before the grand jury. See Lawn v. United *594States, 355 U.S. 339, 349, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 247, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910); United States v. Jordan, 399 F.2d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853-854 (2d Cir. 1964).

¶11Since the indictment was based on other sufficient competent evidence and the statements obtained in the bankruptcy-proceedings were not admitted in evidence before the trial jury, we conclude that the conviction may stand. The judgment is affirmed.

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