United States v. Clark’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

42 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““As used in section 3146-3150 of this chapter— (1) The term judicial officer means, unless otherwise indicated, any person or court authorized pursuant to section 3041 of this title, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to bail or otherwise release a person before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a court of the United States, and any judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions; and. . . . ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Harris · 369 F. Supp. 118 - United States v. Wray

2. “Where a condition of an appearance bond is Violated other than non-appearance before a court or judicial officer, the court still has at its disposal the power to declare a forfeiture of the bond, Brown v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 410 F.2d 212 to revoke bail, United States ex rel. Brown v. Fogel, 4 Cir. 1968, 395 F.2d 291 , 294, to issue a warrant of arrest, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146 (c), and in extreme cases, to declare the violator in contempt of court. United States v. Penn, 2 Crim.L.Rep. 3159 (D.C.Ct. of Gen.Sess.1968). The last is a sanction which “must be used sparingly, and only against deliberate or wilful contemptuous conduct toward the Court.” United States v. Penn, supra, at 3141. But it is not unavailable. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1351 of the Bail Reform Act expressly reserves to the court its traditional powers to punish for contempt. As stated in that section: “Nothing in this chapter shall interfere with or prevent the exercise by any court of the United States of its power to punish for contempt.” The presence of this section in the Bail Reform Act makes it unnecessary to attribute to § 3150 a broader enforcement power than its plain language permits. When an accused willfully violates a conditioft of release, he necessarily violates the court order containing these conditions. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3146 (c). If the circumstances of the violation are extreme enough, see United States v. Green, 1958, 356 U.S. 165 , 78 S.Ct. 632 , 2 L.Ed.2d 672 , the violator’s conduct is punishab”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Williams

3. “Violation of a condition of release constitutes contempt, and for contempt the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are the only limitation on the punishment which may be imposed, short of the Court’s sound discretion. Surely, the Act’s silence of a specific remedy to assure appearance after demonstrated breach of a condition of admission to bail under the Act indicates the extent of the Court’s power under § 3151. The “spirit” of the Act is thus not to limit or to prescribe exclusive remedies for breach of a condition of release, other than appearance in appropriate cases. For breach of condition other than appearance, the Court when proceeding under the Act or under the inherent power may do all that is appropriate to the orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice. Cf. Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642 , 5 L.Ed.2d 683 (1961) (per Harlan, J., as Circuit Justice).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Williams