Bailey v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

73 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Several police officers conducted a ‘hard take down’ of respondent. The officers, with their weapons drawn, forced respondent to the ground and placed him in handcuffs. This conduct was not unreasonable because the officers reasonably could have suspected that that respondent posed a threat to their safety. Considering the totality of the circumstances, as they appeared to the officers at the time, in order to maintain their safety, handcuffing respondent and placing him on the ground for a brief time was reasonable and did not convert the investigatory stop into an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Although this is a severe form of intrusion, we conclude that under the circumstances, it was reasonable.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 230 Md. App. 640 - State v. Sizer · 224 Md. App. 631 - Chase v. State

2. “A show of force is objective conduct demonstrating the officer’s intent to make an arrest. “[Generally, a display of force by a police officer, such as putting a person in handcuffs, is considered an arrest.” [Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 502 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007) ]. In California v. Hodari D., [ 499 U.S. 621, 626 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) ], the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[a]n arrest requires ... physical force” by “laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement.” Although the display of force often involves placing the individual who is seized in handcuffs, application of handcuffs is not a necessary element of an arrest. See Grier v. State, 351 Md. 241, 252 [ 718 A.2d 211 ] (1998) (“Once Petitioner was on the ground and in custody and control of the officers, he was certainly under arrest. Although [the officer] may have had the right to simply detain and question Petitioner before placing him in custody, he did not do so.” (Citations omitted)); Morton v. State, 284 Md. 526, 530 [ 397 A.2d 1385 ] (1979) (holding, where an officer removed the individual from a recreation center and placed him under guard in a patrol car, that “an arrest is the taking ... by any act that indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.... [The officer’s] manual seizure of the appellant and the subsequent restraint of his liberty plainly consti”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 224 Md. App. 631 - Chase v. State

3. “[I]t is ‘impossible for wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.’ The [lawful behaviors displayed during surveillance of appellant are] [] innocent factor[s] without context, but the totality of the circumstances may lead to a conclusion that the lawful [behaviors are] associated with a criminal purpose. [CJontext matters: actions that may appear innocuous at a certain time or in a certain place might very well serve as a harbinger of criminal activity under different circumstances. In the cases in which courts held that ... lawful [activity] consti tuted probable cause for a belief that contraband or criminal activity were present, the surrounding circumstances strongly suggested that [it] was associated with criminal activity.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 226 Md. App. 253 - Lindsey v. State