United States v. Storer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(2) Whoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, subsection (a)(5) shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but , if any image of child pornography involved in the offense involved a prepubescent minor or a minor who had not attained 12 years of age, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or if such person has a prior conviction under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ), or under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Gauld · United States v. Jepsen

2. “Although we have not specifically addressed whether a Florida nolo contendere plea with adjudication withheld constitutes a prior "conviction" for purposes of a sentence enhancement under § 2252A(b)(2) -we have defined "conviction" for purposes of sentence enhancements for prior felony drug offense convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841 . In [United States v.] Slicer , 361 F.3d [1085,] 1087 [ (8th Cir. 2004) ], we held that a defendant's prior guilty plea to a Missouri felony drug offense, for which the defendant received a suspended sentence, constituted a prior conviction for purposes of a sentence enhancement under § 841. In United States v. Franklin , 250 F.3d 653 , 665 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 1009 , 122 S.Ct. 495 , 151 L.Ed.2d 406 (2001), we similarly affirmed a sentence enhancement under § 841(a)(1) that was based on a prior Missouri conviction that resulted in a suspended sentence, noting that "Missouri law does not control the question of what constitutes a 'conviction' for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841 ." Likewise, in [United States v.] Ortega , 150 F.3d [937,] 948 [ (8th Cir. 1998) ], we held that a prior Missouri conviction that resulted in a suspended sentence was a conviction under federal law for purposes of § 841. In each of these cases, the fact that the state "conviction" was not treated as such under state law was not controlling. We also find instructive the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that a plea of nolo contendere in Florida state court that result”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Jepsen

3. “Because Congress provided no explicit language to the contrary in § 2252A(b)(2), we apply federal law to conclude that [the defendant's] Florida felony offense and nolo contendere plea, which resulted in a finding of guilt with adjudication withheld, qualifies as a conviction for purposes of § 2252A(b)(2)'s mandatory minimum ten-year sentence of imprisonment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Jepsen