Hinds v. McNair’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[l]aw of the case designates the doctrine that an appellate court's determination on a legal issue is binding on both the trial court on remand and an appellate court on a subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Board of Commissioners v. Whistler · BD. OF COM'RS OF BENTON CO. v. Whistler

2. ““JUDGEMENT [sic] ENTRY Plaintiffs moved for judgment on fewer than all the issues, under Indiana Rule of Trial Practice 56, and the court finding that the motion was served more than ten (10) days before the hearing of May 2, 1980, and is supported by legally sufficient evidence properly before the court in documents, pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and sworn testimony, or established as the law of this case by the Indiana Court of Appeals or prior order of this Court, now sustains plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the Emergency Service Allowance. This Court now finds: 1. There is no genuine issues as to any material fact involved in this motion and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2. All members of the plaintiff class were sworn. The Court of Appeals so ruled in its prior opinion. Subsequent to that opinion this court made its class determination. To remove any ambiguity plaintiffs requested admissions that all class members were sworn. The request was evasively answered. Thereafter, plaintiffs propounded interrogatories which were evasively and incompletely answered in light of prior testimony in open court January 15, 1979[,] by Robert J. Stanton. Thereafter, plaintiffs requested production of records from plaintiffs[’] personnel file to establish that they were sworn, and incomplete production was made. At a motion for hearing on sanctions correspondence was produced in court that further production w”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Kuespert

3. “f. Person who has died. A person who has died prior to the creation of a trust cannot be a beneficiary of the trust. Thus, if property is transferred inter vivos in trust for a named person who is dead at the time of the transfer, no trust is created. In such a case the transferee ordinarily holds upon a resulting trust for the transferor. See § 411. So also, if a testator devises property in trust for a person who predeceases him, the devise of the beneficial interest lapses, and the person named as trustee ordinarily holds the property upon a resulting trust for the estate of the testator. See § 411. By statute, however, in many States a devise does not lapse under certain circumstances, as for example if the devisee leaves a child; and under similar circumstances a devise of the beneficial interest under a trust does not lapse.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tait v. Community First Trust Co.