413 Pa. Super. 352 - Wu v. Spence’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

39 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The basis of an action for a lack of informed consent is that when a physician touches a patient a technical battery occurs, unless that touching is done with the patient’s consent. An emergency situation is, of course, an exception. The case law has consistently refused to extend informed consent to the administration of therapeutic drugs. This Court has consistently limited informed consent to a battery theory. We will not expand informed consent here. In [Boyer v. Smith, 345 Pa.Super. 66 , 497 A.2d 646 (1985) ], the Court held that the doctrine of informed consent should be limited to those cases involving surgical or operative procedures. The Court based this determination on the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Gray v. Grunnagle [ 423 Pa. 144 , 223 A.2d 663 (1966) ], grounded the doctrine of informed consent “upon the legal theory that the performance of a medical procedure without a patient’s informed consent constitutes a technical assault or battery.” The Court in Boyer felt that to expand the doctrine to the administration of therapeutic drugs would totally obliterate the standard set forth in Gray , and therefore, felt bound by the decision of our Supreme Court in Gray . We must agree with the court in Boyer.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 443 Pa. Super. 245 - Hoffman v. Brandywine Hospital · 431 Pa. Super. 11 - Stover v. Association of Thoracic

2. “The plaintiff must be allowed the benefit of all favorable evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom, and any conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of plaintiff. Further, [i]t has been long settled that a compulsory nonsuit can only be granted in cases where it is clear that a cause of action has not been established. However where it is clear a cause of action has not been established, a compulsory non-suit is proper. We must, therefore, review the evidence to determine whether the order entering judgment of compulsory nonsuit was proper.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2010 Pa. Super. 124 - Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co. · 2009 Pa. Super. 206 - Braun v. Target Corp.

3. “The standard of review on the appeal of a denial of a motion to remove a nonsuit is well settled. The plaintiff must be allowed the benefit of all favorable evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom, and any conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of plaintiff. Coatesville Contractors v. Borough of Ridley, 509 Pa. 553, 558-60 , 506 A.2d, 862, 865 (1986). Further, “it has been long settled that a compulsory non-suit can only be granted in cases where it is clear that a cause of action has not been established.” Id. “However, where it is clear a cause of action has not been established, a compulsory non-suit is proper.” Toth v. Economy Office Forms Corp., 391 Pa. Super. 383, 386-88 , 571 A.2d 420, 422 (1990). “We must, therefore, review the evidence to determine whether the order entering judgment of compulsory nonsuit was proper. Coatesville, 509 Pa. at 559-60 , 506 A.2d at 865 . With this as our standard of review, we have reviewed the record in this matter, and find that it is clear no cause of action was established, and therefore, the trial court properly granted the nonsuit.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Alston v. Commonwealth