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← 415 Pa. Super. 137 - Grant v. GAF Corp.

415 Pa. Super. 137 - Grant v. GAF Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

1992

Citation profile

74
cited by 74 later decisions
3
states following
July 2022
most recently cited

61 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 74 later decisions — most recently July 2022 · most notably Dici v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1996), 440 Pa. Super. 251 - Ammon v. McCloskey (1995)

61 state decisions

5101992200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Crowell v. Benson · United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. · 19 Cal. 2d 807 - Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Association · In Re Peterson · Latimer v. Stainer

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Collateral estoppel is appropriate where: (1) the issue decided in the prior action was identical with the one presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the plea is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a prior action.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Appellant argues, however, the issue presented to and decided by the referee was a narrowly defined statutory one, i.e., had appellant suffered an occupational disease injury. In light of our previous discussion, though, this argument is without basis. As we stated, the referee found unequivocally appellant’s injury was not work-related, and appellant had failed to sustain her burden of proof. This failure was grounded not in appellant’s inability to establish her sarcoidosis as an occupational disease injury, for her claim proceeded without that determination, but rather, in appellant’s inability to prove the causation of her injury was aggravated, accelerated or related in any way to her work for Xerox. This was the central issue in appellant’s workmen’s compensation claim, just as it is instantly, and appellant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before the referee. As that judgment is now final, appellants are estopped from pursuing the identical issue in a common law tort action. To find otherwise would be to undermine the concept of workmen’s compensation which has served the workers and economic structure of our society so well.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “The doctrine of collateral estoppel is not unavailable simply because administrative procedures are involved; where the agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact which the parties had an opportunity to litigate, the court’s will not hesitate to apply preclusion principles. [T]he principles of collateral estoppel apply to judgments from worker’s compensation boards. The issue of causation, injury as a result of exposure in the workplace, was decided adversely to the plaintiffs in the workmen’s compensation proceeding and thus recovery in a subsequent tort action is precluded.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.