Moore v. Bramlett

¶1This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered by the court in favor of the defendant below and the appellee here, John Clifton Bramlett. Plaintiff below and appellant here, Merle Moore, had brought the suit against appellee individually and as next friend for her infant son John David Bramlett for damages by virtue of a breach of promise to marry, and in the alternative for support of her illegitimate son by virtue of hereinafter described sections of the Canal Zone Code and, further, in the alternative for appellee’s breach of promise to contribute to the support of appellant’s infant son.

¶2*528As stated above, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment and appellant duly perfected her appeal to this Court.

¶3We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for trial.

¶4Appellee, a Captain in the Air Force with a wife and two children living in Dallas, Texas, was stationed in the Canal Zone when he met the appellant, a single girl twenty eight years old, who was residing in the Canal Zone as a teacher employed by the U. S. Government.

¶5Appellant testified in her deposition, which was incorporated into her answer to appellee’s motion for summary judgment, that she was seduced by appellee in October, 1964 by his telling her that he loved her and that he wanted to marry her. She learned that she was pregnant in the first part of November, 1964 and that she did not learn that he was a married man until the “first quarter” of November, 1964.

¶6Subsequently, in June, 1965, appellee traveled to Dallas and was introduced to appellant’s friends and relatives and represented himself as appellant’s husband and the father of appellant’s child. Appellee’s son, John David Bramlett, was born in July, 1965. There is, apparently, no question but that John David is appellee’s son.

¶7Appellant is before this Court with three points of error, the first being the error of the trial court in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment for the reason that there is a material issue of fact as to whether appellee promised to marry appellant under circumstances sufficient to constitute a binding contract.

¶8We sustain this point.

¶9It is well settled in Texas that the marriage of the promisor at the time of making the promise is no defense to an action for damages by virtue of a breach of promise where the fact of the promisor’s marriage is unknown to the promisee and where the promisee in good faith relies on the promise and likewise enters into the marriage agreement. Robinson v. Shockley, 266 S.W. 420 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo, 1924, no writ); Dismukes v. Burt, 279 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1955, no writ).

¶10From a review of this entire record we find that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether there was a promise of marriage and a subsequent reliance thereon.

¶11In her deposition appellant admitted that she had previously had relations with another man on two occasions and that she had been engaged to marry this man. Ap-pellee contends that damages for the breach will not lie inasmuch as this intercourse of appellant prior to the promise to marry, and then unknown to appellee, is a defense to the action, since it violates the implied representation by appellant that she is chaste. This is a valid general statement of the law; however, under the rule stated in Coombs v. Fazzio, 386 S.W.2d 650, (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1965, writ ref’d. n. r. e.), the Court held in a situation similar to this that by virtue of his own frequent illicit relations with the promisee a fact issue was raised as to whether there was a misrepresentation of the promisee’s chastity. While in Coombsillicit relations were had by the parties for several months prior to the proposal of marriage, the record here is not clear how many illicit liaisons were had by the parties at bar before the alleged proposal of marriage. Appellant’s deposition does • reflect, however, that relations were had by these parties frequently from October of 1964 until the summer of 1965 and that during this time appellee continuously assured appellant that he wanted to marry her. In fact he represented himself to be appellant’s husband as shown above.

¶12Coombscites with approval from Vogt v. Guidry, 220 S.W. 343 (Tex.Civ.App. San *529Antonio 1920, writ ref’d.) to the effect that the applicable rule as to the elements of fraud necessary to vitiate a contract to marry are similar to those which would invalidate an ordinary contract.

¶13It is our opinion that the pleadings and deposition of the appellant raise a fact issue as to whether there was such an implied representation by the appellee and whether appellant relied on such representations.

¶14Appellant’s second point is the error of the court in granting summary judgment for the reason that Title 8, Sections 461, 464, 465, 466 and 467, Canal Zone Code, requires appellee to support his illegitimate child.

¶15We overrule this point.

¶16Title 8, Section 461 of the Canal Zone Code provides as follows:

“(a) An action pursuant to this sub-chapter may be brought by:

(1) a female resident of the Canal Zone who has delivered an illegitimate child or who is pregnant with a child which, if born alive, would be illegitimate; or

(2) an illegitimate child or, if the illegitimate child is a minor or otherwise incompetent, his next friend.

(b) An action for the support of a child still unborn may not be brought unless the mother files a certificate from an authorized physician specifying that she is pregnant. … ”

¶17Appellant cites this Court to the decision of our Supreme Court in Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 402 S.W.2d 143, 1966, holding that a Texas resident could be held liable for the support of his illegitimate child under a support obligation incurred in Kentucky. Here the action was sought to be enforced and was enforced by the court under a statute of this State known as the Enforcement of Support Act, Vernon’s Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 2328b-l et seq.1

¶18Appellant’s point of error number three is the error of the court in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment for the reason that there is a material issue of fact as to whether appellee promised to support appellant’s illegitimate son.

¶19We sustain this point.

¶20Plaintiff pleaded that while they were both still residents of the Canal Zone, appellee acknowledged paternity of his illegitimate child and led her to believe he would contribute to the support of the child and appellant in reliance of this agreement did forebear instituting paternity proceedings under the above-mentioned Title 8 of the Canal Zone Code.

¶21We hold that appellant was entitled to the protection of the Canal Zone Code during her residency there and that her pleadings alleging a contract of support raise a fact situation pertinent thereto.

¶22Appellee contends that by her deposition, appellant has admitted to being a citizen of Dallas. There is no doubt that after leaving the Canal Zone, before the baby was born, appellant went to Dallas where she had lived previously and became a resident there; however, her residency status at the time she was living in the Canal Zone *530during which time she conceived, is a matter of fact to be determined, 98 A.L.R. 2d 488.

¶23We reverse and remand this cause for trial.

¶24Reversed and remanded.