United States v. Hutul’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

131 federal appellate · 2 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 154 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “particularly appropriate where, as with mail fraud, criminal intent is an essential element of the crime charged.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States v. Turner · United States v. Keane

2. ““First, the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel act as a bar to subsequent proceedings only when the parties to each action are the same, and the Federal Government is neither the same as nor in privity with that of the State of Illinois. See United States v. Wapnick, 198 F. Supp. 359 (D.C.E.D. N.Y. 1961), aff’d. per curiam, 315 F.2d 96 , cert. den. 374 U.S. 829 , 83 S. Ct. 1868 , 10 L. Ed. 2d 1052 ; Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958). Therefore, the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to the case at bar, and do not provide a substitute for a defense of double jeopardy. Second, the Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to the instant case since it applies only to civil suits, not criminal. Finally, we reject defendant Hutul’s contention that his prosecution was without Government authority and therefore void.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States v. King · 54 Ill. 2d 209 - In Re Hutul

3. “Defendant Mitchell contends that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a presentence report on her before passing sentence. Rule 32(c), Fed.Rules Crim.Proc., provides that the probation service of the court shall make a presentence investigation “unless the court otherwise directs.” The decision to direct that no presentence investigation be made rests in the sound discretion of the district court. [Citing Fannon, supra, and Karavias, supra.] Defendant Mitchell has failed to show an abuse of such discretion or how she was prejudiced by the absence of a presentence report. The record reveals that Mitchell’s attorney, in his argument in mitigation after judgment was rendered, brought out the facts necessary to make a proper determination for sentencing. 'Thus, the fact that defendant Mitchell was only 19 years of age at the time of the crime, was a first offender, and was not as actively involved in the scheme as the other defendants was brought out. On this basis, the court imposed a one-year sentence to be followed by two years probation, as compared to the five-year sentences imposed on the other defendants. It is not the function of this Court to substitute its judgment on the proper sentence for that of the district court which viewed the demeanor and deportment of the defendants standing before it. While the use of presentence investigations and reports should be encouraged, we find no abuse of discretion in the instant ease. Id. at 627.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Rosciano