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416 F.3d 1350

Docket No. 03-15299.

United States v. Smith

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided July 18, 2005.

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 2005-07-18

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently October 2017 · most notably Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2012), United States v. Chauncey (2005)

5 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Relies on United States v. Booker · Apprendi v. New Jersey · Edwards v. Arizona

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 2005-07-18

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¶1*1351Kathleen M. Williams, Fed. Pub. Def., Margaret Y. Foldes, Asst. Fed. Pub. Def., Miami, FL, Chantel T. Doakes, Asst. Fed. Pub. Def., Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Smith.

¶2Lisa A. Hirsch, Anne R. Schultz, Asst. U.S. Atty., Suzan H. Ponzoli, Miami, FL, for U.S.

¶4ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

¶5Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK*, Judge.

¶6PER CURIAM:

¶7This case is before this Court for the second time. We previously affirmed Smith’s sentence in United States v. Smith, 385 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir.2004). On February 28, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our September 27, 2004 judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).

¶8*1352Having now considered Smith’s case in light of Booker, we affirm Smith’s sentence not only for the reasons stated in our prior opinion, but also for those explained below. We first review the procedural history of this case prior to Booker.

¶9I. BACKGROUND

¶10After pleading guilty, Bryan Winfred Smith was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment for bank robbery. At his 2003 sentencing in the district court, Smith did not raise any constitutional claim to a jury trial on sentencing factors nor any constitutional issue based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

¶11On direct appeal in 2004, Smith argued only that the district court misapplied the Guidelines in concluding that he was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a). According to Smith, his prior state convictions had been “functionally consolidated” for sentencing and were therefore “related” pursuant to § 4AI .2(a)(2). Thus, Smith argued that he did not have two prior convictions for purposes of § 4Bl.l(a). In his initial brief and reply brief on direct appeal during 2004, Smith did not raise any constitutional claim to a jury trial on sentencing factors or any constitutional issue based on Apprendi.

¶12After Smith’s initial and reply briefs on direct appeal were filed, Smith filed a “Motion for Leave to File a Substitute Initial Brief’ attempting to raise a constitutional claim to a jury trial as to the use of his prior convictions as sentencing factors. On September 8, 2004, this Court entered an order denying Smith’s motion based on our well-established prudential rule that issues not timely raised on direct appeal are abandoned.1

¶13*1353In short, in the district court and on direct appeal, Smith did not timely raise any constitutional claim to a jury trial as to any sentencing enhancements or that the Guidelines were unconstitutional.

¶14On September 27, 2004, after review and oral argument, this Court affirmed Smith’s sentence. In doing so, we concluded that the district court did not err in applying the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a) in sentencing Smith. United States v. Smith, 385 F.3d 1342, 1346 (2004).

¶15Smith filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. On February 28, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our September 27, 2004 judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Booker. The Supreme Court’s remand order in Smith’s case stated as follows:

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).

¶16Smith v. United States, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 1401, 161 L.Ed.2d 175 (2005).2

¶17II. CONSIDERATION IN LIGHT OF BOOKER

¶18On remand, we now consider Smith’s case in light of Booker, and explain why under Booker defendant Smith is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing.

¶19In Booker, the Supreme Court instructed courts to "apply today's holdings-both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act-to all cases on direct review." Booker, 125 SCt. at 769. However, the Booker Court also emphasized that even though Booker was to be applied to cases on direct review, it did not mean that "every sentence gives rise to a Sixth Amendment violation . ... [or] that every appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing." Id. Particularly, the Supreme Court stated that courts are to "apply ordinary prudential doctrines ... [includ-ingj, for example, whether the issue was raised below . . . ." Id.

¶20The Booker decision is not the only one in which the Supreme Court has recognized the principle that retroactivity on direct appeal is subject to ordinary prudential doctrines. The Supreme Court has recognized this principle in other cases. See Pasquantino v. United States, — U.S. —, n. 14, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 1781 n. 14, 161 L.Ed.2d 619 (2005); Shea v. Louisi*1354ana, 470 U.S. 51, 58 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 1065, 1069 n. 4, 84 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) (concluding that “if a case was pending on direct review at the time Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, (1981)] was decided, the appellate court must give retroactive effect to Edwards, subject, of course, to established principles of waiver, harmless error, and the like”).

¶21Pasquantino is particularly instructive here. In Pasquantino, decided after Booker, the petitioners argued “in a footnote that their sentences should be vacated in light of Blakely ...Pasquantino, 125 S.Ct. at 1781 n. 14. However, the petitioners “did not raise this claim before the Court of Appeals or in their petition for certiorari.” Id.Although the petitioners failed to previously raise the issue, “[t]his omission was no fault of the defendants, ... as-the petition in this case was filed and granted well before the Court decided Blakely. Petitioners thus raised Blakely at the earliest possible point: in their merits briefing.” Id.at 1783 n. 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Despite the fact that petitioners raised their Blakely claim at the earliest possible moment after that decision was released, the Supreme Court applied its prudential rules and declined to address the issue. Id.at 1781 n. 14.3

¶22As we recently stated in United States v. Levy, “[i]t seems relatively obvious that if the Supreme Court may apply its prudential rules to foreclose a defendant’s untimely Blakely, now Booker, claim, there is no reason why this Court should be powerless to apply its prudential rule to foreclose defendant [Smith’s] untimely Blakely, now Booker, claim.” United States v. Levy, 416 F.3d 1273, 1277, 2005 WL 1620719, at *3 (11th Cir.2005).

¶23Thus, we again follow our prudential rule and conclude that Smith is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on Booker because he did not raise a Blakely- or Boofcer-type issue in his initial brief on direct appeal and thus abandoned the issue. See United States v. Vanorden, 414 F.3d 1321, 1322, 2005 WL 1531151, at *1 (11th Cir.2005) (“Because Vanorden did not challenge his sentence on Sixth Amendment-Apprendi-Blakely-Booker grounds in his first trip through this circuit, this argument is ‘deemed abandoned.’ ”); United States v. Pipkins, 412 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir.2005) (“The well-established law in our circuit requires that issues be raised in the parties’ initial brief.”); United States v. Sears, 411 F.3d 1240, 1241 (11th Cir.2005) (stating that “[t]he Appellant’s failure to raise the [Booker] issue in his initial brief bars him from doing so now”); United States v. Dockery, 401 F.3d 1261, 1262 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining to consider on remand Booker issue not raised in appellant’s initial brief).

¶24In addition to the Supreme Court’s instruction in Booker that we apply our ordinary prudential rules, we also note that it *1355is not “unduly harsh” or “overly burdensome” to require parties to raise issues in their initial briefs. Levy, 416 F.3d at 1278, 2005 WL 1620719, at *4. We explained this point in Levy, as follows:

Requiring all parties to raise issues in their initial briefs is not unduly harsh or overly burdensome. This is particularly true about constitutional challenges to the federal sentencing guidelines, which have continued to be raised for many years despite adverse precedent. Moreover, when Apprendi was decided in 2000, criminal defense attorneys were well aware of Apprendi’s potential impact on the sentencing guidelines well before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely and Booker. For example, in numerous cases before our Court, defense counsel, after Apprendi and before Blakely, asserted that their clients’ rights to a jury trial were violated when the district court enhanced their sentences with extra-verdict enhancements not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. These Apprendi-tjpe arguments about federal sentencing enhancements were made in those cases not only before Blakely but also despite adverse precedent in United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir.2001).

¶25Levy, 416 F.3d at 1278, 2005 WL 1620719, at *4 (internal citations omitted).

¶26Finally, although we do not consider Booker-type arguments not raised in an appellant’s initial brief, “we have liberally construed what it means to raise a Blakely-type or Booker-type issue.” Levy, 2005 WL 1620719, at *5 (citing United States v. Dowling, 403 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir.2005), which set forth factors to consider when determining whether appellant raised a Booker-type claim).4 The problem for Smith is that he never timely raised a constitutional claim as to his career-offender enhancement in any shape or form in either the district court or in his initial brief on direct appeal.5

¶27In sum, as we stated in Levy, “Booker itself recognized that retroactivity is subject to ordinary prudential rules, and thus nothing in Booker undermines or affects our prudential rules; if anything, Booker contemplates that they should be applied in Booker-remand cases.” Levy, 416 F.3d at 1280, 2005 WL 1620719, at *5.

¶28Thus, in considering this case in light of Booker and in applying our prudential rules (as Booker instructs us to do), we affirm Smith’s sentence for the reasons outlined herein and in our prior opinion. We also reinstate our prior opinion affirming Smith’s sentence. United States v. Smith, 385 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir.2004).

¶29OPINION REINSTATED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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