Resendiz v. Kovensky’s Empirical Analysis
416 F.3d 952 · 2005
Citation profile
10 federal appellate · 2 district · 9 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (§ 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Gideon v. Wainwright · Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Enrico St Cyr · Jones v. Cunningham · Custis v. United States · Maleng v. Cook
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““It is well-established that ‘once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of the conviction are not them selves sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for purposes of a habeas attack upon it,’ [Citations omitted.] Immigration consequences, such as deportation, have long been viewed as ‘collateral,’ and thus are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody.’ [Citation omitted.] While Maleng noted that collateral consequences could prevent a petition — -filed while the petitioner was in state custody — from becoming moot after a petitioner is released from custody, Maleng foreclosed any argument that collateral consequences could satisfy the in custody requirement for a petition filed after the expiration of the state sentence. [Citation omitted.]” Resendiz, 416 F.3d at 956 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“'in custody’ requirement has been interpreted to mean that federal courts lack jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions unless the petitioner is 'under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed' ”) (citing Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490-91 , 109 S.Ct. 1923 ); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 , 1254 (10th Cir.2004) (stating that”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"[S]evere consequences notwithstanding, two independent agencies (indeed, sovereigns) are operating here. The state's action is entirely independent of the INS's action initiating deportation proceedings, and the state has nothing to do with deportation. Thus, while Resendiz is indeed threatened with banishment, it is not a threat imposed by the state court, and there is nothing unlawful about the INS detention." Resendiz, 416 F.3d at 958 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.