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← 416 FSUPP 22 - Arnold v. Sendak

Arnold v. Sendak’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
2
states following
March 2018
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently March 2018 · most notably Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach (1981), Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action (1977)

9 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

14019761980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 2284 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Roe v. Wade · Wisconsin v. Constantineau · Doe v. Bolton · Lake Carriers' Association v. A Macmullan · Berger v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a non-resident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’ “With respect to the state’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above . that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably related to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.” Id”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The challenged section of the Indiana abortion statute is clearly unconstitutional. The decisions in Roe and Doe expressly state that regulation by the State as to the facility in which an abortion is to be performed is the type of regulation which can only occur after the ‘compelling point’ or end of the first trimester. “The Supreme Court expressly prohibited such regulation prior to the compelling point: ‘This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this “compelling” point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effected by an abortion free of interference by the State.’ “In Doe, the Supreme Court also expressly held ‘that the hospital requirement of Georgia law, because it fails to exclude, the first trimester of pregnancy . is also invalid.’ ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The challenged section of the Indiana abortion statute is clearly unconstitutional. The decisions in Roe and Doe expressly state that regulation by the State as to the facility in which an abortion is to be performed is the type of regulation which can only occur after the ‘compelling point’ or end of the first trimester.” 416 F.Supp. at 23-24 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.