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416 So. 2d 715

Bragg v. State

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided June 25, 1982

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1982-06-25

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"(5) The extent and nature of the child's physical and mental maturity; and "(6) The interests of the community and of the child requiring that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline."”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including TRD v. State, T.R.D. v. State

“"Transfer hearings are `probable cause' hearings, and the transferring court should not be reversed unless its ruling is clearly erroneous."”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Ex Parte JR, J.R. v. State

Relies on Kent v. United States · 353 So. 2d 1384 - Brown v. State · Duncan v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-06-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently August 2004

24 state decisions

130198219902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1

¶2The sole issue raised by this appeal is the propriety, velnon, of the juvenile court's transfer of Culley Max Bragg, a juvenile 14 years of age, to the circuit court for criminal prosecution as an adult. The complaint filed against Bragg charged that he was delinquent in that he did intentionally cause the death of another person in violation of Code 1975, §13A-6-2.

¶3Because our affirmance mandates a subsequent trial of this cause before the Calhoun Circuit Court, we deem a full recitation of the facts untimely and improvident. It is sufficient for the purposes of this review to set out a portion of the juvenile court's order effecting the transfer:

¶4 "The Court considering the results of that report, testimony taken on December 8, 1981, and the other matters as set out above, finds as follows:

¶5 "1. That probable cause exists that the offense of Murder as alleged in the petition was committed and that said child committed said offense.

¶6 "2. That said child at the time the alleged offense occurred was over 14 years of age and the act he was alleged to have committed would be a felony had he been an adult.

¶7 "3. That the evidence is insufficient to show that the child is committable to an institution or agency for the mentally retarded or mentally ill.

¶8 "4. That said child has an extensive juvenile court record.

¶9 "5. That said child is a small 14 year old white male.

¶10 "6. That there has been little benefit of the past treatment efforts on the part of the Juvenile Court.

¶11 "7. That it would be in the best interest of the public to grant the motion.

¶12 "The Court considering the above and each aspect of 12-15-34 (d), Code of Alabama, 1975, including the nature of the present offense, the child's demeanor, the extent and nature of the child's physical and mental maturity and the extent and nature of the child's prior delinquency record and the nature of the past treatment efforts and the child's response to such efforts as set out in the probation officer's report, and for cause shown,

¶13 "It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the said Culley Max Bragg be and is transferred to the Circuit Court of Calhoun County for criminal prosecution as an adult and is bound over to the grand jury for further investigation."

¶14Transfer hearings are "probable cause" hearings, and the transferring court should not be reversed unless its ruling is clearly erroneous. Duncan v. State, 394 So.2d 930 (Ala. 1981);Terrell v. State, 379 So.2d 1238 (Ala. 1980); Williams v.State, 361 So.2d 1157 (Ala. 1978). *717

¶15Probable cause, in the context of transfer hearings, has been defined as "that which would warrant a man of reasonable prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed and that the person in question is the offender."Duncan, supra, quoting Vincent v. State, 349 So.2d 1145 (Ala. 1977). The trial court's ruling may be found to be clearly erroneous if the order issued does not recite that the court has considered the six factors outlined in Code 1975, § 12-15-34 (d). The objective of § 12-15-34 (d) is to provide a "meaningful review" as mandated by Kent v. United States,383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). The mere recital in the transfer order, however, that the trial court has considered the six statutory factors is sufficient, Brown v.State, 353 So.2d 1384 (Ala. 1978), where there is evidence to support the order.

¶16Close analysis of the record shows what we believe to be more than sufficient evidence to uphold the juvenile court's order of transfer. Consequently, the judgment appealed from is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.

¶17AFFIRMED.

¶18TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

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