416 So. 2d 804 - McCray v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 74 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he fact that the defendant might have a better chance of acquittal or a strategic advantage if tried separately does not establish the right to a severance. Nor is hostility among defendants, or an attempt by one defendant to escape punishment by throwing the blame on a codefendant, a sufficient reason, by itself, to require severance. If the defendants engage in a swearing match as to who did what, the jury should resolve the conflicts and determine the truth of the matter.”

   20 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Viniegra v. State · Herrera v. State

2. “ordinarily applies in those murders which are characterized as executions or contract murders, although that description is not intended to be all-inclusive.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. King v. State · Cannady v. State

3. “In that case, two brothers, Preston and Marvin Crum, were charged with murder. Prior to trial, counsel for appellant Preston obtained a statement from codefendant Marvin which was in total accord with Preston's version of the incident. After the jury was sworn, Preston learned that Marvin had changed his story and intended to accuse Preston, at trial, of committing the murder. Marvin was not required to give the statement, but once he did so, Preston was entitled to rely on that statement. When codefendant Marvin changed his story after the jury was sworn, we determined that, on a proper motion, severance was necessary because Preston was, under these circumstances, denied a fair trial. The problem in Crum was not simply that the codefendants had antagonistic defenses. The problem was that one codefendant induced the other to believe that their defenses would be completely consistent and then, after jeopardy attached, decided to change his story, thereby prejudicing the proper preparation of the case for trial. The circumstances would have been different had there been no prior statement or had there been sufficient notice before trial of the change in Marvin's position.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 478 So. 2d 38 - Dean v. State · 794 So. 2d 579 - Jones v. Moore