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416 S.W.2d 456

Brock v. Boss

Court of Appeals of Texas

Decided May 25, 1967

Court of Appeals of Texas · decided 1967-05-25

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently December 1978

6 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““There is no circumstance here, other than the fact that Mrs. Bass stopped on a yellow light, which can be relied upon to support the finding that she failed to keep a proper lookout for the automobile following her. It was not shown that she was speeding immediately prior to arriving at the intersection, nor that she failed to signal her intention to stop. She simply failed to run the yellow light as Stockton perhaps thought she would. It seems to us that in view of the wording of the statute, as well as for considerations of personal safety, a cautious person would stop on a yellow light, and evidence showing that a motorist did that and nothing more is insufficient to support a finding of negligence. The law does not require one to employ split-second timing in determining whether to cross a street intersection on a yellow light or not.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Colom v. Vititow

Relies on Kuykendall v. Doose · Bass v. Stockton

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1967-05-25

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

WILSON, Justice

¶1(dissenting).

¶2I dissent. The majority opinion is based on the theory that “plaintiff had a legal right to stop her car when the traffic signal turned yellow.” Plaintiff’s legal right to stop solves no question here. The question is not of her right to stop, but the manner of stopping. The question is whether there was any evidence of probative force to sustain the jury findings of negligence and *458proximate cause as to the manner of stopping. There is. Neither the trial court nor we have authority to disregard that finding. The question is not one of how we would have found as members of a jury.

¶3In Bass v. Stockton, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 229, no writ, cited by the majority, there was no jury finding as to the manner in which the lead car was stopped. The only question was sufficiency of evidence on the proper lookout finding against the driver of the lead car, and that dealt with lookout to the rear. It was held the evidence did not raise the issue. As to the mere fact of stopping, the court emphasized: “that and nothing more is insufficient to support a finding of negligence.” Here there is more. There is a sudden stop from a speed of 30 miles per hour, right at the light, “almost on the intersection.” The lead car was “almost on the light” when the driver “hit her brakes hard and came to a sudden stop.”

¶4In Kuykendall v. Doose, Tex.Civ.App., 260 S.W.2d 435, writ ref. n. r. e., the jury found the lead car was stopped so suddenly as to constitute a hazard to rear vehicles, but found the sudden stop was not negligence. Again the question was whether evidence supported a finding that the lead driver failed to keep a proper lookout to the rear. The present question was simply not in either case cited.

¶5Here the jury found the lead car was stopped more suddenly than it should have been stopped in the exercise of ordinary care. To follow the majority reasoning would be to hold the lead car will invariably be free from negligence in stopping (regardless of the circumstances attending, and the manner of the stop) if there is an amber or yellow light.

¶6When the evidence, including favorable circumstances and inferences sustaining the jury findings, is given effect and contrary evidence disregarded, as is required in this appeal, there is no authority to ignore the jury finding. I would reverse.

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