Shultz v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In 1976, the State Department of Toxicology promulgated regulations requiring the certification of chemical test operators 'who analyze blood, urine or body materials' 260 IAC 1-4-2. Those regulations were promulgated pursuant to statutory authority found at 1.C. 9-4-4.-5-6. In 1976, at the time the regulation in question was promulgated, I.C. 9-4-4.-5-6 appeared to include all types of chemical test operators. The statute was amended in 1978, however. As amended, it specifically discusses only the certification of breathalyzer test operators. By amending the statute to narrow its scope the legislature clearly intended to, and did, include only breathalyzer operators and test devices under the statute. That hoary maxim of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, works against Shultz, as does the elementary principle of administrative law that an administrative agency or department can only promulgate regulations which fall within the scope of the agency's enabling legislation. This has long been true in Indiana By its failure to amend its regulations consistent with the restriction of the scope of the enabling legislation under which they were originally promulgated, an agency cannot retain power which it has lost through legislative amendment. While this court recognizes that the delegation of legislative power is necessary for the effectiveness of modern government, K. Davis, Administrative Law Text (8d ed. 1972) § 1.02 at 3-4, we also recognize tha”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hutchison ex rel. All Other Taxpayers of the County of Jefferson v. Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners · Hutchison v. STATE BD. OF TAX COM'RS

2. “"In Shultz v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 417 N.E.2d 1127 (transfer denied), the defendant, while being treated in a hospital emergency room for injuries received in a wreck, had a blood sample withdrawn. The trial court permitted the laboratory technician who performed the blood test to testify to the incriminating blood alcohol level the test had revealed .... The Shultz court stated ...: "The determination by the Supreme Court in Schmerber [v. California, (1966) 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ], that there was no constitutional impediment to drawing a blood sample to determine the physical condition of a suspect provides a basis for Indiana statutes on the subject. IC. 9-4-4.5-1 provides, inter alia, that '[alny person who drives ... a vehicle on the public highways of this state shall be deemed, by virtue of such driving, ... to have given his implied consent to submit to a chemical test for intoxication when asked to submit to such tests by any law enforcement officer. 1.0. 9-4-4.5-2 defines 'chemical test' as including blood tests taken for the determination of the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Thus, despite his protestation to the contrary, Shultz did indeed consent to the blood test in question. The gist of his argument going to this issue implies that because the doctor who ordered the blood test did not testify as to a medical necessity for the test, it was taken for the sole purpose of determining Shultz's blood alcohol content. Shultz a”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pollard v. State · Van Allen v. State

3. “"(a) A physician, or a person under the direction of a physician, who performs a chemical test on blood obtained from another person, shall disclose the results of such a test to any law enforcement officer when a prosecutor or his deputy requests the results as a part of a criminal investigation. ~ (b) A physician, hospital, or an agent of either is not civilly liable for disclosing test results in accordance with this seetion. (c) For the purposes of this section, the privileges arising from a patient-physician relationship do not apply to the test results described in this section, and these test results may be admitted in a criminal proceeding in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence. (d) The exceptions to the patient-physician relationship specified in subsection (c) do not affect those relationships in any proceedings not covered by this seetion. (e) The test results obtained by a law enforcement officer under subsection (a) may only be disclosed to a prosecuting attorney of his deputy for use as evidence in a criminal proceeding. (£) Nothing in this section requires a physician or person under the direction of a physician to draw blood or perform a chemical test on blood."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Zimmerman v. State