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← 417 So. 2d 620 - Milton v. State

417 So. 2d 620 - Milton v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1982

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
1
states following
February 2002
most recently cited

10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently February 2002

10 state decisions

80198219902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 386 So. 2d 1180 - Tice v. State · Ex Parte Tice · Wall v. State · Jackson v. State · 370 So. 2d 332 - Flint v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Counsel for both the State and appellant are allowed wide latitude in drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence in their closing arguments. A prosecutor as well as defense counsel has a right to present his impressions from the evidence, if reasonable, and may argue every legitimate inference. Manigan v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 402 So.2d 1063 , cert. denied, Ala., 402 So.2d 1072 (1981)." . . . . . The court noted also: "Furthermore, the credibility of a witness is a legitimate subject of criticism and discussion. Flint v. State, Ala.Cr. App., 370 So.2d 332 ; Smith v. State , Ala.Cr.App. 344 So.2d 1239 , cert. denied, 344 So.2d 1243 (Ala.1977)."”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to attack the credibility of the appellant's witness, nor did the prosecutor personally vouch for the credibility of the State's witness.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Every fact the testimony tends to prove, every inference counsel may think arises out of the testimony, the credibility of the witnesses, as shown by their manner, the reasonableness of their story, their intelligence, means of knowledge, and many other considerations, are legitimate subjects of criticism and discussion. . . . The presiding judge, as a rule, will best determine when discussion is legitimate, and when it degenerates into abuse and undue license. While he should not permit wanton abuse of adversary or witness, he would occupy questionable ground, if he arrested counsel in his attempt to educe inferential facts or intents from testimony in proof. Argument is but an aid to the jury, to enable that body to arrive at correct conclusions; and it would be dangerous to accord to the presiding judge the right and power to intervene, and declare authoritatively when an inference of counsel is or is not legitimately drawn. This is for the jury to determine, if there be any testimony on which to base it.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.