¶1ON REHEARING
¶2In his motion for rehearing appellee earnestly argues that we erred in holding that the trial court’s order constituted a change in custody. Appellee cites us to the opinion of our Supreme Court in the recent case of Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.Sup.1967).
¶3We have carefully studied the opinion in the Leithold case and have concluded that our holding in the instant case is not contrary to or inconsistent with Leithold.
¶4In the case now before us appellee very carefully refrained from alleging or undertaking to prove that there had been any change of conditions since the entry of the original divorce decree. His position, as urged again in his motion for rehearing, is that such allegation and proof are unnecessary, since this is only a plea for a “clarification of visitation rights.” In his motion appellee says, “By implication, the Supreme Court holds that, in judging the validity of an order changing only visitation, it is unnecessary to plead and prove change of conditions.”
¶5We do not agree with appellee. The Supreme Court expressly declared:
“It is clear to us that the judgment of the trial court modified the Arizona decree with respect only to the visitation rights of petitioner and that custody of the child as awarded by the Arizona court was unaffected. There being evidence of a change of conditions sufficient to support such order, we reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm that of the trial court.”
¶6Just as it is practically impossible to draw an exact line marking the change from one color to another in a rainbow, so it is practically impossible to draw an exact line marking the change from visitation to a modification of custody in cases involving children. Yet the time comes when the difference is apparent and must be recognized. In the instant case appellee suggested in his pleading and with his evidence sought a judgment giving him “visitation” rights with his child in Texas in charge of her father for two months of each year — one-sixth of the whole time — hundreds of miles from her custodial home in the State of Alabama. Though he did not succeed in obtaining all that he asked for he did obtain a decree giving him charge of the child in Texas for four weeks of *86each year — one-thirteenth of the whole time. In the Leitholdcase the father was granted only a two weeks’ visitation period.
¶7In the Leitholdcase the court said, “Custody of a child connotes the right to establish the child’s domicile and includes the elements of immediate and direct care and control of the child, together with provision for its needs. … These rights inherent in a custody status are not held by one enjoying visitation rights as provided in the custody decree.” (Emphasis ours.) Applying the above principles we are still of the opinion that the case before us involves an attempted modification of custody, notwithstanding appellee’s desire to label it merely “clarification of visitation rights.”
¶8We think the Leitholdcase may be distinguished from the case now before us in other respects, but we shall not further extend this opinion.
¶9The motion for rehearing is overruled.