Wheeler v. Barrera’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

67 federal appellate · 7 district · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 191 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Of course, the cooperation and assistance of the officials of the private school is obviously expected and required in order to design a program that is suitable for the private school. It is clear, however, that the Act places ultimate responsibility and control with the public agency, and the overall program is not to be defeated simply because the private school refuses to participate unless the aid is offered in the particular form it requests. The private school may refuse to participate if the local program does not meet with its approval. But the result of this would then be that the private school’s eligible children, the direct and intended beneficiaries of the Act, would lose. The Act, however, does not give the private school a veto power over the program selected by the local agency.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Barrera v. Wheeler · Albert C. Walker Roberta M. Walker John C. Soso Jacklyn C. Soso Margaret Smith Alyce Crosdale Betty Sands v. San Francisco Unified School District, and United States Department of Education Lamar Alexander, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of Education, Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants. Albert C. Walker Roberta M. Walker John C. Soso Jacklyn C. Soso Margaret Smith Alyce Crosdale Betty Sands v. Board of Education of the San Francisco Unified School District, City and County of San Francisco, State of California Ramon Cortines, Superintendent of Schools, San Francisco Unified School District San Francisco Unified School District, Albert C. Walker Roberta M. Walker John C. Soso Jacklyn C. Soso Margaret Smith Alyce Crosdale Betty Sands v. San Francisco Unified School District, City and County of San Francisco, State of California, and Deborah Martin Jacob Perea Barbara Perea, Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants. Albert C. Walker Roberta M. Walker John C. Soso Jacklyn C. Soso Margaret Smith Alyce Crosdale Betty Sands v. William Honig, as California Superintendent of Public Instruction California Department of Education California State Board of Education, and San Francisco Unified School District, Albert C. Walker Roberta M. Walker John C. Soso Jacklyn C. Soso Margaret Smith Alyce Crosdale Betty Sands v. Board of Education of the San Francisco Unified School District San Francisco Unified School District, City and County of San Francisco, State of California Ramon Cortines, Superintendent of Schools, San Francisco Unified School District, United States Department of Education Deborah Martin Lamar Alexander, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of Education Jacob Perea Barbara Perea, Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees

2. “"At the outset, we believe that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that federal law governed the question whether on-the-premises private school instruction is permissible under Missouri law. Whatever the case might be if there were no expression of specific congressional intent, Title I evinces a clear intention that state constitutional spending proscriptions not be pre-empted as a condition of accepting federal funds. The key issue, namely, whether federal aid is money `donated to any state fund for public school purposes,' within the meaning of the Missouri Constitution, Art. 9, § 5, is purely a question of state and not federal law. By characterizing the problem as one involving `federal' and not `state' funds, and then concluding that federal law governs, the Court of Appeals, we feel, in effect nullified the Act's policy of accommodating state law. The correct rule is that the `federal law' under Title I is to the effect that state law should not be disturbed. If it is determined, ultimately, that the petitioners' position is a correct exposition of Missouri law, Title I requires, not that that law be preempted, but, rather, that it be accommodated by the use of services not proscribed under state law. The question whether Missouri law prohibits the use of Title I funds for on-the-premises private school instruction is still unresolved." 417 U.S. at 416-419 , 94 S.Ct. at 2283 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mallory v. Barrera · Felter v. Cape Girardeau School Dist.

3. “Moreover, even if, on remand, the state and local agencies do exercise their discretion in favor of [on-premises] instruction, the range of possibilities is a broad one and the First Amendment implications may vary according to the precise contours of the plan that is formulated. For example, a program whereby a for mer parochial school teacher is paid with Title I funds to teach full time in a parochial school undoubtedly would present quite different problems than if a public school teacher, solely under public control, is sent into a parochial school to teach special remedial courses a few hours a week. At this time we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of any particular program.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Aguilar v. Felton Secretary United States Department of Education · Felton v. Secretary, United States Department of Education