Smith v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

50 federal appellate · 1 district · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 72 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[s]ome crimes, by their very nature, tend to be committed in a single continuous episode rather than in a series of individually chargeable acts. An ordinary assault, for example—that is, an assault that is not accompanied by an intent to commit another offense—is usually such a crime. "The fact that a criminal episode of assault involves several blows or wounds, and different methods of administration, does not convert it into a case of multiple crimes for purposes of sentencing." Joyriding is another example of this type of continuing crime. Other crimes, are not so continuous. In the case of a robbery, for example, a separate charge may be sustained for each successive taking. A robbery—or an attempted robbery, as in this case—tends to be completed quickly and to leave the perpetrator at a fork in the road where he must consider whether to retreat or to invade another interest. For this reason robbery is often accompanied by other crimes.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 803 So. 2d 695 - Hayes v. State · Brown v. United States

2. ““The District of Columbia Code sets out in four provisions the definitions and punishments for four kinds of assault with descending degrees of severity: D.C.Code § 22-501, Assault with intent to kill, rob, rape, or poison (15 years maximum); D.C.Code § 22-502, Assault with intent to commit mayhem or with dangerous weapon (10 years); D.C.Code § 22-503, Assault with intent to commit any other offense (5 years); D.C.Code § 22-504, Simple Assault (1 year). This structure suggests that the offenses of assault with intent to kill and assault with a dangerous weapon are regarded as offenses on the same spectrum, the former being worse than the latter. The statute suggests a gradient of aggravated assaults. Although the various sections may define ‘separate and distinct offenses,’ it is unlikely that Congress intended a single act to be punished cumulatively as both a more and a less serious form of aggravated assault.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Jenkins

3. “We do not think such dismissal is required, at least for delay of the extent before us, unless defendant makes out a prima facie case of prejudice to his defense. Smith v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 284 , 418 F.2d 1120 (1969).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 386 F. Supp. 932 - Griffin v. United States