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← 418 F.2d 1302 - Ruehlmann v. Commissioner

Ruehlmann v. Commissioner’s Empirical Analysis

1969

Citation profile

20
cited by 20 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
November 2001
most recently cited

12 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2001

12 federal appellate · 1 district ·

11019691970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 2031

Relies on Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. South Texas Lumber Co · United States v. Correll · Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. A Stidger · Powers v. Commissioner · United States v. Gordon Simmons and I. v. Simmons, Executors of the Estate of B. Hill Simmons

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““I do not dispute the principle that respondent’s regulations should be sustained unless they are unreasonable. But it does not follow that, because respondent has a choice of alternatives, his choice should be sustained where the alternative chosen is unrealistic. In such a situation the regulations embodying that choice should be held to be unreasonable. In my opinion, the regulations involved herein are clearly unrealistic as applied to the factual situation involved herein and therefore to that extent unreasonable. “The touch stone of fair market value has always been the price which a willing seller could reasonably be expected to be able to obtain from a disposition of the property in question. Thus, if shares of stock are subject to a binding restriction, which is the product of an arm’s-length transaction, that the shares may not be sold without offering them to a third person at a certain price, that price becomes the ceiling for determining the fair market value of the shares for estate tax purposes. . “In the life insurance cases, the courts were obviously influenced by the facts that the insurance is a different ‘breed’ due to the element of insurability, or the lack thereof, of the insured at the time of the transfer and the significant increment which would be received on the death of the insured; that, shortly before the policy was transferred, the taxpayer had paid a substantially higher price for the insurance than its cash surrender value; and that there was”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(b) Valuation of property in general. The value of every item of property includible in a decedent’s gross estate under sections 2031 through 2044 is its fair market value at the time of the decedent’s death, except that if the executor elects the alternate valuation method under section 2032, it is the fair market value thereof at the date, and with the adjustments, prescribed in that section. The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fair market value of a particular item of property includi-ble in the decedent’s gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price. Nor is the fair market value of an item of property to bo determined by the sale price of the item in a market other than that in which such item is most commonly sold to the public, taking into account the location of the item, where-ever appropriate. Thus, in the case of an item of property includible in the decedent’s gross estate, which is generally obtained by the public in the retail market, the fair market value of such an item of property is the price at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at retail. For example, the fair market value of an automobile (an article generally obtained by the public in the retail market) includible in the decedent’s gross estate is the price for which an automobile”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Petitioner contends that the redemption price should be the determinant of value because that price represents the amount which the decedent or the estate would have received had the shares been sold on the valuation date. However, this is not necessarily the only criterion of value for estate tax purposes. Value may be determined by an objective standard if it is not unreasonable. The hypothetical ‘willing buyer’ and ‘willing seller’ are presumed to act objectively based upon their knowledge of the relevant facts. “ . . . In United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306 , 88 S.Ct. 445, 449 , 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967), the Court has furnished these guidelines for a court reviewing a treasury regulation : “ ‘Alternatives to the Commissioner’s . . . rule are of course available. Improvements might be imagined. But we do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the courts, the task of prescribing “all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue Code.’ ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.