Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 418 F.2d 82 - Grove Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia

Grove Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia’s Empirical Analysis

418 F.2d 82 · 1969

Citation profile

33
cited by 33 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
6
states following
January 1981
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 1981 · most notably Marks v. United States (1977), 17 Cal. 3d 42 - People Ex Rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater (1976)

11 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions

290196919701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (Tariff Act of 1930) · 28 U.S.C. § 2281 · 28 U.S.C. § 2283 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Connally v. General Construction Co. · Cantwell v. State of Connecticut · Roth v. United States · Dombrowski v. Pfister · Zwickler v. Koota

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““We have concluded that as a standard for regulating first amendment rights, neither ‘injury to the public,’ nor ‘unreasonableness,’ standing alone, is sufficiently narrow or precise to pass constitutional muster. Each is too elastic and amorphous a standard by which to restrain the exercise of free expression. What is encountered with the sprawling doctrine of public nuisance is an attempt to restrict First Amendment rights by means analogous to those under ‘a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application.’ Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 , 60 S. Ct. 900, 905 , 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). The common law of public nuisance may be a perfectly valid method by which to implement a state’s police power in certain defined circumstances where, for example, it is used to restrain that which is prohibited by other constitutionally appropriate standards. It may not be used, however, both to define the standards of protected speech and to serve as the vehicle for its restraint.” (Grove Press Inc., 418 F.2d 82, 88 .)”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The purpose of a Pennsylvania preliminary injunction hearing is to receive prima facie evidence of facts to be ultimately established at the final hearing.“There are two kinds of injunctions in [Pennsylvania] courts of equity. The one is preliminary or interlocutory; the other final or perpetual. The object of the first in general is simply preventative—to maintain things in the condition in which they are at the time until the rights and equities of the parties can be considered and determined after a full examination and hearing.” ’. . . “The rules do not designate when the final hearing must be held subsequent to the granting of a preliminary injunction, although the general practice is to calendar equity actions on an accelerated trial list. . . . “The mischief we perceive in the Pennsylvania equity rules is that there is no guarantee a final hearing will be seasonably scheduled after the issuance of a preliminary injunction and that a prompt decision will be forthcoming thereafter. The preliminary restraint could exist days, and even months, before the judicial decision on the merits; where this possibility exists, an unacceptable threat to the freedom of expression without due process of law results. Failure to provide the necessary expeditiousness tinges the Pennsylvania preliminary injunctive procedures with unconstitutional hues when they are employed to restrain or inhibit expression prior to a final adjudication of an alleged obscene matter. [¶] “. . . It is only ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.