Pyles v. Keane’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 4 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Conduct that may give rise to an action for malicious prosecution may also constitute a violation of Section 1983 if, acting under color of state law, the defendant has thereby subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of' constitutional magnitude. See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 126 (5th Cir. 1963). But, standing alone, a claim for malicious prosecution — although it may describe conduct reprehensible in the extreme — is not enough to support a cause of action under Section 1983.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Riggs v. Miller · 481 F. Supp. 1157 - Pollard v. Baskerville

2. “§ 653. Elements of a Cause of Action [for Malicious Prosecution] A private person who initiates or procures the institution of criminal proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged is subject to liability for malicious prosecution if (a) he initiates or procures the proceedings without probable cause and' primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice, and (b) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused. § 682. General principle [Abuse of Process] One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process. Comment: a. The gravamen of [abuse of process liability] is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings that were brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them. The subsequent misuse of the process, though properly obtained, constitutes the misconduct for which the liability is imposed under the rule stated in this Section.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 445 F. Supp. 315 - Voytko v. Ramada Inn of Atlantic City

3. ““Cerbone [plaintiff] does not allege that the evidence from the ‘show-up’ itself was introduced at his trial or that any harm resulted from it. The mere failure of a ‘show-up’ to pass constitutional requirements, without a showing of resulting prejudice, does not establish a constitutional deprivation. The constitutional guarantee against a pretrial confrontation ‘that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification’ does not exist in vacuo but is meaningful only by reference to the right of an accused to a fair trial, of which it is a corollary. No violation of the due process clause occurs unless an improper identification has some prejudicial impact on an accused’s defense.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Hensley v. Carey