418 Pa. Super. 614 - Commonwealth v. Mallory’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]e do not hesitate in finding that there was probable cause to associate the concealed object with criminal activity, and we believe that the veteran officer (being involved with more than a hundred criminal instances of “narcotics in plastic bags”) was justified in thinking that the object he saw contained drugs. It is the “probability” of criminal activity and not its “certainty” which is the measuring rod against which the totality of the circumstances confronting the police are to be weighed in determining the presence of probable cause to arrest. Commonwealth v. Fiore, 281 Pa.Super. 1 , 421 A.2d 1116 (1980). We find that the facts, when viewed in toto, painted a “picture of probable cause” allowing the police to arrest the appellee. To do otherwise woüld be to take a myopic view of the facts and render a decision totally devoid of common sensical inferences to be drawn by trained police officers with regard to drug activity. We hold that the actions of the police, under the totality of the circumstances, was proper and not violative of either the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions (Art. 1, Sec. 8; Fourth Amendment, respectively).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 438 Pa. Super. 119 - Commonwealth v. Robinson · 443 Pa. Super. 351 - Commonwealth v. Evans

2. “It is axiomatic that the validity of a warrantless arrest is determined by considering “whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officer had probable cause to make it,” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 , 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964), and the person arrested is believed to be the guilty party. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 348 Pa.Super. 207 , 501 A.2d 1143 (1985), allocatur denied; Commonwealth v. Pytak, 278 Pa.Super. 476 , 420 A.2d 640, 644 (1980). It is only the probability of criminal activity that is the standard of probable cause. This means less than the evidence which would justify conviction, or even a prima facie showing of criminal activity; but more than a mere suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 437 Pa. 326 , 263 A.2d 886 (1970). Specifically, we have stated: Probable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. As the Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown, supra [ 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)] commented [ 460 U.S. at 741 ] 103 S.Ct. at 1543 : It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 [ 69 L.Ed. 543 ] (1925), that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A “practical, non-technical” probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 423 Pa. Super. 289 - Commonwealth v. Brinkley