¶1(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶2I concur in the majority’s disposition of the first issue. Although I agree with the majority’s legal analysis under Issue 2, I dissent because I believe it misapplies the law to these facts.
¶3Clearly, the standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the severance motion. State v. Closs, 366 N.W.2d 138 (S.D.1985); State v. Van Beek, 88 S.D. 154, 216 N.W.2d 561 (1974) overruled on other grounds State v. Kaseman, 273 N.W.2d 716 (S.D.1978). The burden is on Dixon “to present facts demonstrating that prejudice resulted from the trial of several offenses and denied him fair trial.” Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 624 (Wyo.1985); see also United States v. Hamilton, 694 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.1982); State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis.2d 185, 316 N.W.2d 143 (1982).
¶4The majority concludes that the facts presented here establish that prejudice resulted. I disagree.
¶5Although it would have us believe that the “chance of getting a fair trial” on both Counts VI and VII “is slim,” the majority seems to minimize and discount the acquittal by the jury on Count VII. Does not the *704acquittal manifestly establish that Dixon had a fair trial on Count VII, and totally erode the majority’s suggestion that his chances of a fair trial were “slim”? Would the majority have us believe that Dixon had an “unfair” trial on Count VII, but a “fair” result?
¶6The trial court properly admonished the jury through its Instruction 6 that:
A separate offense is charged in each of the counts of the Indictment. You must separately consider each count and the evidence which applies to it. The fact that you may find the Defendant guilty or not guilty on any one count of the Indictment must not control or influence your verdict on any other count or counts of the Indictment.
¶7The jury, as honest citizens and sensible men and women, fulfilled their duty and conscientiously considered each count separately. They convicted him for the offenses he committed and acquitted him on the offense he did not commit. The majority does not suggest that the evidence was not sufficient to establish his guilt on Counts I — VI.
¶8In my view, on the face of the record, it is clear that no prejudice resulted. I would affirm.
¶9(dissenting).
¶10In my opinion, the trial court erred when it did not sever Counts VI and VII. However, the error was harmless. Defendant was entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. I would affirm.