Slagle v. Singer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is thus seen that MAI 26.01 is not, under the facts of this casé, an applicable instruction which, under Rule 70.-01(b), must be given to the exclusion of any other on the same subject, so that we need not consider the effect of using the words ‘allowed and permitted’ instead of ‘furnished’ as if we were dealing with an MAI instruction which must be given to the exclusion of any other. MAI 26.01, as its language connotes and as the Committee’s comment indicates, Missouri Approved Jury Instructions, pp. 214-215, relates to suppliers of chattels for a business purpose. The Committee points out that the pattern instruction ‘covers only one area and will merely serve as a guide where the substantive law requires that other issues be submitted’. Rule 70.01(e) provides for modifications of MAI where necessary to submit the issues fairly in a particular case or where there is no applicable MAI. Here there was no applicable MAI and so this is not an example of an unnecessary deviation from a required instruction. Defendant Singer submitted a modification of MAI 26.01 which meets the requirements of being simple, brief, impartial, free from argument and not submitting detailed evidentiary facts. We do not believe instruction No. 5 is susceptible to the particular attacks plaintiff makes against it and therefore overrule plaintiff’s contentions and affirm the judgment.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Erny v. Revlon, Incorporated

2. ““Your verdict must be for the defendants whether or not defendants were negligent if you believe: First, Plaintiffs either: smelled gas in the premises on the day of the occurrence and used the facilities about the premises without investigating the origin of the gas, or instructed the defendants the premises would not be used until June 21, 1968, or after, and the defendants started work on the premises, but plaintiffs, contrary to such instructions used the premises without notifying defendants, or instructed the defendants the premises would not be used until June 21, 1968, or after, and the defendants started work on the premises, but plaintiffs, contrary to such instruction permitted their son to use the premises without notifying defendants, or plaintiffs used the premises knowing of the odor of gas, knowing work was in progress, knowing the gas range was inoperative, and with such knowledge failed to investigate or take precaution ; Second, plaintiff’s conduct, in any one or more of the respects submitted in paragraph First, was negligent; and Third, such negligence of plaintiffs directly caused or directly contributed to cause any damage plaintiffs may have sustained.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Holt v. Myers