The Tolchester’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““But it is still insisted, as to the restraining order, that, whatever maybe the jurisdiction of this court, it is prohibited by Rev. St. § 720. This section is a re-enactment, with some change of language, of the fifth section of ¡lie act of March 2, 1793 ( 1 Stat. 335 ). The quasi ion thus raised, so far as it depended on tlie original statute of 1793, is disposed of,, so far as this court is concerned, in favor of the power to restrain tlie suits conformably lo the rules of the supreme court by the decision in the case of The Oceanus (In re Providence, etc., Steamship Co.); 6 Ben. 131 [Fed. Cas. No. 11,451]. is * * The question is whether the introduction of this exception into section 720. as to laws relating to bankruptcy, is to be deemed to take away the power to restrain given in tlie original act by what has been held to be tlie necessary implication of the words ‘after such transfer all claims and proceedings against the owner shall cease,’ which were re-enacted without change in section 4283. Whatever the effect of section 720, section 4285 effectually deprives the state court before which such claim or proceeding is pending of all jurisdiction. The only question is, on which court is imposed the duty or conferred the power to issue a restraining order, if a restraining order shall be necessary to prevent the plaintiff in such suit from proceeding with his suit? It cannot be supposed that this was to remain on the statute book a mere brutum fulmen, with no power to ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Whitelaw

2. ““The district court has possession of the only fund to which the claimants have a right to resort, for the payment of their claim. It is the only court competent to settle, by a decree binding upon all parties interested, the question of right of the shipowner to have his liability limited. The injunction would therefore appear to be, as in the case of Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, ancillary to its administration of that fund, and necessary to prevent its judgment and its proceeding from being nugatory.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Whitelaw