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Giant-Powder Co. v. Oregon Pac. Ry. Co.’s Empirical Analysis

42 F. 470 · 1890

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
February 1932
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 1932

4 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

4018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Brooks v. Railway Co. · Commissioners of Buncombe Co v. Tommey · Basshor v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad · Neilson v. Iowa Eastern Railway Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “‘‘The subsequent act might have been passed out of abundance of caution, and not upon any well-grounded or serious impression that the former was wanting or insufficient in this respect. Be this as it may, the opinion of the legislative assembly of 1889 as to the scope and purpose of the act of 1885 is of very little moment, and can have no weight in the construction of the later one concerning rights and transactions which were vested or transpired before its existence. The intention of the legislature of 1889 in passing the act of that year- is a proper subject of judicial inquiry and determination; but its opinion of the scope and effect of the act of 1885, if it had any, is not material in this case. Considering the peculiar provisions of the act of 1889, the most obvious reason for its passage is that the legislature thereby intended to take the subject of claims against railway corporations for materials and labor furnished out of the operation of the general lien law of 1885 and put it under this special act, which does not require any notice of the claim to be filed with any' clerk or other officer, and provides a special proceeding in which all such claims must be enforced as in one suit. It must be admitted that, if the legislature intended to include railways in the act of 1885, it is not apparent why so important a' subject was not mentioned in the long list of those expressly named. Still the language of the act is certainly broad and comprehensive enough to incl”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““Section 1. That any and all person or persons who shall hereafter as subcontractor, material-man or laborer, furnish to any contractor to any railroad corporation any fuel, ties, materials, supplies or other article or thing, or who shall do or perform any work or labor for such contractor in conformity with any terms of any contract, express or implied, which such contractor may have made with any such railroad corporation, shall have a lien upon all property, real, personal and mixed, of said railroad corporation: provided, such sub-contractor, material-man or laborer shall have complied with the provisions of this act, but the aggregate of all liens hereby authorized shall not in any case exceed the price agreed upon in the original contract to be paid by such corporation to the original contractor. Nor shall such corporation be liable for any greater sum than the amount then actually due by such corporation to said original contractor: and provided, further, that no such lien shall take priority over existing lien.” Laws 1889, p. 75.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““The plaintiff’s right to the remedy which he seeks must depend on the statute. * * * The principal question litigated on this appeal is whether or not this statute gives a lien for labor against the property described in the complaint; in other words, do these poles, planted in the ground, connected together by wires and insulators, constitute a structure within the true intent and meaning of this statute? In answering this question, but little aid can be had from the decisions of other states, for the reason that no' general principle of law is involved, and such decisions have generally turned upon the special or peculiar phraseology of the particular statute. Without attempting .to indulge in any refined distinctions or definitions, and ■ having in view the objéct and purpose of the enactment in question, I think, ¡t may properly be held that the poles, wires, insulators, etc., mentioned in the complaint, constitute a structure within the meaning of the statute, and that the same is subject to a lien for labor performed thereon.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.