Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 42 F.3d 220 - Conner v. Donnelly

Conner v. Donnelly’s Empirical Analysis

42 F.3d 220 · 1994

Citation profile

42
cited by 42 later decisions
August 2022
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 6 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently August 2022 · most notably Groman v. Township of Manalapan (1995), Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service (2009)

11 federal appellate · 6 district ·

1801994200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Estelle v. Gamble · Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. · West v. Atkins · Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. · Polk County v. Dodson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Regardless of whether the private physician has a contractual duty or simply treats a prisoner without a formal arrangement with the prison, the physician’s function within the state system is the same: the [SJtate authorizes the physician to provide medical care to the prisoner, and the prisoner has no choice but to accept the treatment offered by the physician. Even where a physician does not have a contractual relationship with the [S]tate, the physician can treat a prisoner only with the [S]tate’s authorization. ... The source of deprivation does not change because the physician has no contractual relationship with the [S]tate: the physician acts under color of state law because the state has incarcerated the prisoner and denied him the possibility of obtaining adequate medical care on his own.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “First, a private party that is regulated by the state acts under color of state law where there is a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2786 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 , 351 95 S.Ct. 449, 452 , 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)). Second, a private party acts under color of state law where the state, through extensive regulation of the private party, has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement that the action must in law be deemed to be that of the state. Id. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. at 2786. Finally, a private party acts under color of state law where “the private entity has exercised powers that are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.’ ” Id. at 1005, 102 S.Ct. at 2786 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353 , 95 S.Ct. at 455 ).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[That] which would convert [a] private party into a state actor might vary with the circumstances of the case.... [T]he Court has articulated a number of different factors or tests in different contexts.... Whether these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved here.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.