Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

42 Ind. 387

Reynolds v. Ross

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided May 15, 1873

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1873-05-15

<p>Slander.—In a complaint for slander, the words spoken were alleged thus: “You are a G—d d-d, lying, thieving son of a bitch.”</p> <p>Held, on demurrer, that the words were actionable.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently August 1984

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[the adjective thieving imports an act committed, and not merely an inclination to commit it. To charge one with being a thieving person is charging him with being guilty of stealing”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Agnew v. Hiatt

“a G-d d-d, lying, thieving son-of-a-bitch”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Agnew v. Hiatt

Relies on Alley v. Neely

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1873-05-15

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Downey, J.

¶1Action for slander by the appellee against the appellant: A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and the appellant excepted. Issues were formed, and there was a trial by jury, and a verdict for the plaintiff A motion by the defendant for a new trial overruled, and final judgment for the plaintiff.

¶2But one question is presented by the assignment of error, and that is as to the sufficiency of'the complaint. The objection is that the words as charged are not actionable. The words alleged to have been spoken to and of the plaintiff are these: “ You are a G—d d-d, lying, thieving son of a bitch.” In Alley v. Neely, 5 Blackf. 200, this court said : “The adjective thieving imports an act committed, and not merely an inclination to commit it. To charge one with being a thieving person is charging him with being guilty of stealing. Bittridge’s Case, 4 Coke’s Rep. 19; Osborn v. Poole, 1 Lord Raym. 236; Stark, on Slander, 64.” The use of the letters “ G—d d-d ” does not render the complaint bad in this case. If they are wholly omitted or disregarded, the slanderous charge is still the same.

¶3The judgment, which was for one hundred and forty dollars, is affirmed, with ten per cent, damages and costs.

/42/ind/387 · .json · Public domain