Volume 42 — Iowa Reports

Action upon a policy of insurance. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and a judgment rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. One who has an insurable interest in property destroyed can recover only the value of such interest. (Niblo v. JSÍ. A. Ins. Co., 1 Sandf., S. C., 556; Carpenter v. 'Prov. Wash. Ins. Co., 16 Pet., 501; Sussex Co. Mut. Ins.

Action to recover the value of a mare and colt alleged to have been killed by the careless act of defendant in running a train over them. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

This action is upon a contract in the following words: “ It is agreed by and between J. C. Conger and A. W. Chilcote that First.

A%>j)eal from Page Cireuit Court. This is an action to quiet in plaintiff the title to the north half of the northeast quarter, section four, township seventy, range thirty-six, in Page county. The court below entered a decree for plaintiff as prayed. The defendants appeal.

Action upon an official bond executed 'by defendant, Howard, and bis co-defendants as sureties, for the faithful discharge of his duty as county treasurer. The cause was sent to a referee who was directed to hear the evidence and report the facts. Upon the coining in of his report judgment was rendered against defendants for $20S.22. A large part of the costs of the reference were taxed, upon motion of defendant, against the plaintiff. Both parties appeal.

On the 13th day of September, 1873, Henry, Lee & Co., commenced an action in the District Court of Montgomery county, claiming of defendants $2,124.64. The venue was changed to Mills county, and at the September Term, 1874, of the court of said county, the cause was tried and a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs, which was set aside by the court, and the cause was continued to the February Term.

At the September Term, 1874, of this court, an opinion was filed reversing the above entitled case, and directing that the defendants have judgment for one-third the amount of taxes paid upon the lands in controversy, with interest at six per cent from the respective dates of payment. See 39 Iowa, page 601.

The plaintiff filed his petition in substance alleging that on the 5th day of November, 1875, he placed in defendants’ elevator 462 20-60 bushels of wheat, subject to storage, taking a receipt in writing therefor, as follows: “ Received in store, of C. Dierkson, twelve loads of wheat, subject to storage.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court affirming a judgment or order of a justice of the peace setting aside a judgment by default. The case was brought before the Circuit Court upon writ of error. Upon a proper certificate of the judge of the Circuit Court, the plaintiff appeals to this court. The facts appear in the opinion.

Action upon a policy of insurance covering a dwelling house and certain personal property. The property was destroyed by fire. The facts of the ease appear in the opinion. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

This action is brought in equity to quiet the title to certain real estate in the plaintiff. Upon a trial the court rendered a decree as prayed for in the petition, from which defendants appeal.

The defendant was indicted and convicted of the crime of keeping a nuisance, by erecting and keeping a place for the purpose of selling intoxicating liquors in violation of law. The court adjudged the defendant to pay a fine of $500 and the costs of prosecution. Defendant appeals. The facts necessary to an understanding of the points ruled are stated in the opinion.

At the November term, 1872, the defendant was indicted for willfully and knowingly obstructing a public highway, on April 15, 1872. The defendant pleaded not guilty. Upon a trial to a jury at the October'term, 1871, the defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of ten dollars and costs of prosecution. The defendant appeals.

Plaintiff brings this action to recover from the county for injuries received by being precipitated from a bridge, situated upon a public highway in the county. The cause was tried to a jury, resulting in a general verdict for the plaintiff for fifteen hundred dollars. A special verdict was also rendered by the jury.

This action was commenced March 25, 1873, to recover upon a claim against the estate of A. Hermann, deceased, the defendant being administrator. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations in regard to filing claims against an estate, being section 2405 of the Revision. There was a trial to tbe court, and a judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. A promise by the administrator that he will pay a judgment does not relieve the holder from the duty of filing it.

In the vacation following, and within the time prescribed, the appellee’s counsel filed a petition for rehearing. A reply thereto was ordered and filed, and we have given to the case a further and more deliberate consideration. The action is at law, and the petition contains two counts.

A'pjjeal from Polk District Court. On the 26th day of March, 1874, the defendant was indicted for the crime of nuisance, committed as follows: “ The said Mary Odell, on the 1st day of April, A. D., 1873, in the County of Polk aforesaid, and on each day from then until the finding of the indictment, did unlawfully erect, cause, continue and keep a house of ill fame, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness, at No. 117 Walnut street, East Des Moines, in said…

. The plaintiff’s petition alleges that# on the third day of October, 1873, the defendants were partners in the purchase and shipment of fat hogs; that they employed plaintiff to purchase hogs for them at a specified price, and to be delivered at a time and place agreed upon; that the plaintiff purchased and offered to deliver the liogs according to tbe contract, and that tbe defendants refused to receive them, whereby the plaintiff has suffered damages in the sum of five…

Action to recover for false and fraudulent representations, made by the defendant, as to the extent and amount of his interest in a stock of groceries owned by himself and another as partners, which was sold by him to plaintiff. The cause was sent to a referee, and upon his report judgment was rendered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. In examining questions of fraud, all circumstances attending the transaction may be inquired into.

This is a suit in equity brought by the plaintiff to quiet in him the title to certain lands in Harrison county, Iowa. Upon a trial before the District Court a decree was rendered for the plaintiff. Defendants appeal. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.

The 'defendant was indicted and convicted for keeping a certain room in the basement of the Ballingall House, as a place in which he kept for sale and sold intoxicating liquors contrary to law. Jury trial resulting in a verdict of guilty. Defendant appeals from the judgment thereon.

Action at law: There was a judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

On February 24, 1875, this action was commenced. The plaintiffs by their petition state, that between May 28 and October 1,1869, they performed-labor and furnished materials, upon request of defendant, in manufacturing cards, circulars and 2,500 copies of a book known as Davies’ History and Directory of Madison County, Iowa. That said goods were to be delivered to defendant as he called for them.

This is an action at law, in which the plaintiff alleges that he was duly appointed receiver of the Lamar Insurance Co., by the Superior Court of Cook county, in the State of Illinois, in an action brought in said court against said insurance company, by Edward and E. R. Burnham, on the 23d day of November, 1872; that said insurance company in April, 1870, complied with the laws -of Iowa, and established a branch office at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and became thereby virtually a…

<p>1. Mortgage: sale or personal property. When the mortgagor of personal property sold the same with the consent of the mortgagee, the purchaser undertaking to pay a part of the mortgage debt, and agreeing that the lien of the mortgage should in the meantime continue, and the purchaser afterward sold the property to one who had no knowledge of the agreement between the purchaser and the mortgagee and no actual notice of the mortgage: Held, that the lien of the mortgage followed the property into the hands of the last purchaser.</p>

On the 6th day of March, 1873, tho plaintiffs filed their petition claiming of the defendant Statler the sum of $326.52, and asking a writ of attachment. On the 7th of March an attachment issued and was levied upon certain, personal property's the property of Statler.

’ On August 25, 1874, the plaintiff filed liis petition stating that lie and the defendant intermarried, Januaiy 31,1872, and that they continued to live together as husband and wife till May, 28, .1872, when the defendant without cause abandoned him. That, November 16,1872, there was bom to them a son. He asked for a divorce and for the custody of the child.

The petition of plaintiff alleges that on the 21st day of May, 1874, she was the owner of certain flour and corn meal of the value of $227.75, and that on said day the defendant, as sheriff of Fremont county, by virtue of an execution in favor of Hawes, Babcoeh ITawes, Babcock & Co. filed their petition in intervention, alleging that they are the real parties interested as defendants, and were the. parties plaintiff in execution by virtue of which the sheriff made the levy…

The facts as agreed in this case are that on February 11, ■ 1875, the plaintiff filed his petition in two counts, the first being upon a promissory note in the usual form.

On the 6th day of October, 1873, the plaintiffs commenced their action, claiming of defendant the sum of two hundred dollars, and alleging as cause of said claim that, during the year 1868, the plaintiffs were the owners of certain lands in the petition described; that the defendant was in possession of, and used and occupied said land, and received all the benefits of tbe same, during the year 1868, and has failed to account to plaintiffs therefor, and that the rents and…

Upon motion of defendants this cause was transferred in the court below to the chancery docket, to be tried as an equity 'case. From this order plaintiff appeals. The facts of the cáse appear in the opinion.

The petition of plaintiff alleges, in the first count, that the defendants, John Keyes- and J. C. Yelzer, are engaged as partners in banking under the firm name of the Cass County Bank.

<p>1. Tax Sale: tenant in common. The purchase at tax sale of land hold in joint-tenancy, by one of the holders, is presumed to have been made in trust for his co-tenants, until the presumption is repelled by their refusal to contribute pro rata to reimburse him for the money advanced.</p> <p>2. -:--. Such purchaser may enforce contribution from- his co-tenants.</p>

This action is brought by the plaintiff as the assignee of a promissory note as follows: “Twelve months after date I promise to pay to Samuel King one hundred and fifty-seven dollars and fifty-seven cents, for value received, with ten per cent interest from date.” “The above note is due and payable as specified, provided Sam.

<p> Appeal from Howard Cwcu-it Court. </p> <p>Action in chancery. The petition shows that certain lands owned by plaintiff were sold for taxes in 1856, and purchased by G-. W. Strother, who assigned the certificate of purchase to James IT. Easton, to whom the tax deed was made. Easton conveyed the land to West. Strother and Easton are joined as defendants. The sale is alleged to be fraudulent and void on the ground, among others, that Strother bid in the land in pursuance of an arrangement and combination between himself and other bidders, whereby competition was cnt off by each bidder in turn taking the whole of tracts of land for the taxes due thereon, the others agreeing not to bid against him in consideration that each of them, when their turn should come to bid, in a like manner, should be free from competition. The petition shows that Easton was the assignee of the certificate of purchase, and that West “ had full knowledge of the defects in Easton’s title, and had knowledge of the manner in which the land was purchased at the tax sale and of the manner in which the sale was conducted,” and that the sale of the land by Easton to him “ is fraudulent and was made by collusion between said defendants to perfect the title to said land and to defraud plaintiff.” The petition prays that the tax sale and deed may be declared fraudulent and void and be set aside, and the title held by defendant, West, be decreed to be of no effect, and plaintiff’s title be quieted:</p> <p>The answer denies the allegations of the petition and claims title in West to the land under the tax sale, and, asking relief as upon a cross petition, prays that the title-may be quieted in defendant. It further prays that in case the tax title be held void, West may recover the amount of taxes levied and collected since 1863, the year in which the taxes for which the land was sold became delinquent, with ■ interest thereon, as allowed by statute upon delinquent taxes.</p> <p>Upon the final hearing plaintiff’s petition was dismissed and the relief prayed for by defendants was granted. Plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>An unlawful combination among the bidders at a tax sale will vitiate the title in the hands of the purchaser. (Kerwer v. Alien, 31 Iowa, 578; Easton v. Mawleinney, 37 Iowa, 601.) By thé assignment of a certificate of purchase the assignee acquires only the rights of the assignor, and he holds subject to all the equities which might have been urged against it in the hands of the latter. (Watson v. Phelps, 40 Iowa, 482; Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y.,-535.) The assignee having received his deed directly from the treasurer will be considered a party to the sale and the fraud. (Eldridge v. Kuelil, 27 Iowa, 160.) It having been established that the title of the purchaser is fraudulent, the burden is upon the defendant to show the bona fides of his purchase, and this he is bound to do by evidence outside of the recitals in his deed. ( Watson v. Edwards, 23 Texas, 447; Sillyman v. King, 36 Iowa, 207; Kittridge v. Chapman, .Id., 348; Faloonbury v. Mcllravy, Id., 488; Lane v. Krelde, 22 Id., 406; Rogers v. Bur-chard, 7 Am. Rep., 286.) The sale of the land in forty acre tracts, it having been assessed to a known owner in eighty acre tracts, invalidated the sale. (Willey v. Saoville, 9 Ohio, 43.)</p> <p>The plaintiff must have alleged all the facts tending to show the bona fides of the defendant’s purchase. (Sillyman v. Kvng, 36 Iowa, 207; Lane v. Krelde, 22 Id., 406; Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 Id., 15.) The deed from the purchaser to his grantee being a regular conveyance, and the latter not having been shown to have purchased with notice of • plaintiff’s equities, he must be considered a bona fide purchaser for value and thus protected. (Van Schaaclc v. Robbins, 36 Iowa, 201; Sibley v. Bullis, 40 Iowa, 429.) It is the policy of the law to protect judicial and tax sales, and an application to cancel one should be made within a reasonable time. (Stewart v. Ma/rshall, 4 G. Greene, 75; Cunnvngham v. Felher, 26 Iowa, 117; Wallace v. Berger, 22 Id., 456.) The deed is conclusive respecting the manner of the sale. (.ifcCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 398.)</p>

Appeal frovi Dubuque District Court. This is an action brought by the plaintiff, a wife, under Code, Sec. 1757, to recover damages sustained by her in consequence of the sale of intoxicating liquors to her.husband. There are sixteen persons made defendants.

On the 18th day of December, 1874, the plaintiff filed his petition for judgment for the value of various articles of merchandise furnished the defendant, James R. Hartsock, and which were used in remodeling and improving certain buildings in the petition described, and asking the enforcement of a mechanic’s lien against the property.

This is an agreed case, submitted to the Circuit Court upon the following facts: On the 9th day of May, 1874, Wenrott, Howard & Coimpany recovered judgment against one Langdon, before a justice of the peace, and a transcript thereof was filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court, on the 20th of the same month. At this time Langdon owned certain real estate in- New Hampton.

Tire petition which was filed on the 2d day of December, 1873, in substance alleged that on the 3d of August, 1872, the defendant, J. M. Ives, executed and delivered to Wooster Ives a mortgage upon the west half of the east half of lots numbered four, five, six and seven, block numbered seventy-five, in the city of Boone, to secure a promissory note for the sum of $2,170.00.

Defendant was convicted of the crime of resisting an officer in the discharge of liis duty, and appeals to this court. '■'The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

Tiie plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court of Howard county k petition for an injunction, restraining the enforcement of a judgment, rendered by Ii. S. Bronson, a justice of the peace of Wakefield township, Fayette county, upon a note for $62.50, executed by plaintiff, payable to the Fayette Home Insurance Company or bearer, at Fayette, Fayette county.

On the 20th of March, 1875, the plaintiff filed her petition asking for a divorce from defendant, on the ground of alleged inhuman treatment endangering her life, consisting in administering to her jioisonous medicines and drugs, assaulting and beating her, neglecting to furnish plaintiff and her child suitable provisions and clothing, and refusing to furnish her necessary attendants to take care of her during her years of severe affliction.

The plaintiff in his petition alleges that in 1874, L. T. Genuug and others petitioned the proper authority for the establishment of a now county road in Mills county; that at the time the plaintiff was a citizen of the county and the owner, under a contract of purchase, of certain real property through which the projiosed road ran; that a commissioner was duly appointed, and on the 30th day of March, 1874, reported in favor of the establishment' of the proposed road; that…

Action of replevin. Trial by the court. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion. An appeal to the Supreme Court brings up for review the intermediate rulings of the court below which have been duly excepted to and not otherwise waived. (Jones v. C. Where one stands by and permits another to purchase property without ascertaining his title or claim, he is estopped from controverting the same.

AppeaZ from Delawme District Court. The plaintiff alleges that she is the wife of the defendant, and in a petition of. eleven counts she claims damages of defendant for eleven distinct assaults and batteries at various times from August 15,1874, to July 26, 1875.

Plaintiffs sue to recover the amount of two bills of nursery stock, sold to the defendant by them, one for $13.25, and the other for $123.33, which they allege to be due and unpaid.

The petition in substance alleges that on the 18th day of November, 1873, plaintiffs, made a verbal contract with the defendants, Horr and J. B. Kelley, to furnish lumber for a building situated upon lot 8, block 14, in the village of Rock Falls, of which lot said defendants were owners; that in pursuance of said contract plaintiffs furnished lumber of the value cf $214.89, with which said defendants erected a frame building on said lot; that plaintiffs filed with the clerk…

The plaintiff brings this action to recover for alleged injuries received by the plaintiff, by being struck by defendant’s cars on the crossing of a highway on defendant’s railroad, while the plaintiff was on said crossing with a loaded team. Jury trial. Yerdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

This cause was tried by the court upon the following agreed statement of facts: “ 1st. That on the 29th day of December, 1874, an information was filed before J. R. Campell, a justice of the peace, charging the defendant with permitting a minor, to-wit: J. .

This is a mandamus proceeding to compel defendant, who is the auditor of the city of Dubuque, and charged with the duty of receiving money paid for the redemption of property sold for taxes, under the ordinance of the city, and of issuing proper receipt or certificate therefor showing redemption, to receive a certain sum tendered by plaintiff for the redemption of certain real estate from a tax sale made under the city ordinance for delinquent city taxes.

This action is brought to- recover a sum of money alleged to be found due from the defendant to the plaintiff,, upon a settlement of the business of a partnership which had been - carried on by the plaintiff and defendant, and one J, A. Baer.r There was a trial by the court without a jury resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff for $383.30 and costs of suit. Defendant appeals.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of perjury, was convicted and sentenced to the penetentiary for two and one-half years. The defendant appeals. When evidence tends to prove the issue or form a link in the chain of proof, however slight, it is admissible. (1 Greenl. on Ev., § 51; Farwell v. Tyler, 5 Iowa, 535; State v. Hinkle, 6 Id., 380; Whart. Or.

<p>1. Evidence: criminal law: opinion on witness. A witness who, upon direct examination, had testified only to the fact of discovering defendant in her house in the night time, could not be asked upon cross-examination if she had not subsequently stated that she did not “ think defendant intended to steal anything.”</p> <p>2. Criminal Law: intent to commit crime: evidence. The intent with which an act is committed is not of the nature to be established by direct proof, but may be derived from the facts and circumstances attending the act.</p> <p>3. -:-: circumstantial proon. Where the act itself is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence, the proof must exclude every other hypothesis than that of the prisoner’s guilt; aliter, if the act is admitted or proved by direct testimony, and the intent with which it is committed is only in question.</p> <p>4. -: intent: drunkenness: evidence. Drunkenness is no excuse for crime, but where a specific intent is necessary to constitute the crime, proof of drunkenness is admissible to show that the defendant could not have consciously formed or acted upon the intent at the time the alleged crime was committed.</p> <p>5. -: burglary: includes “entering.” An indictment for burglary includes the offense of entering a dwelling in the night time without breaking, and will sustain a conviction for the latter offense.</p> <p>6. Practice: criminal law: jury. Where the jury had been fully instructed and after retirement communicated to the court that they had no doubt that defendant committed the act charged, but were in doubt respecting the intent, it was not error for the court to refuse to discharge them, or fail to instruct them to bring in a verdict of acquittal.</p> <p>7. -: -: verdict. Under an indictment for burglary, the jury found the defendant guilty of entering a dwelling; Held, that the court properly regarded the verdict only as special and directed them to reconsider it.</p>

This is an appeal from the decision of the Circuit Court uj>on a writ of error to a justice of the peace in the county of Howard. The Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the justice, and defendant appeals. The record contains the proper certificate of the court below. The facts of The case are stated in the opinion.

Action in chancery. There was a decree dismissing plaintiff’s petition, from which sbe appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

Appeal from, Wvnneshieh District Court. Action at law upon an account for lumber sold. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action upon a promissory note. The cause was sent to a referee, and upon his report judgment was rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion. A committee having been entrusted with the notes, a single member of it was not authorized to deliver them to plaintiff. (Hubbard v. Ger. Gath.

The plaintiff alleges in her petition that on the 28th day of February, 1859, she sold to the defendant, Adam Gebhert, certain land for $2,400, receiving in cash $400, and the written obligations of Gebhert for the balance of the purchase money, and that at Gebhert’s request she executed a warranty deed for said land to Abraham N. Graeffj Gebhert and Graeff having an understanding and arrangement that if Gebhert would obtain the conveyance of said land to Graeff to secure…

<p>1. Fees: service oe notice. The original notice in an action in the Circuit Court may be served by a constable, and he is entitled to receive therefor fifty cents and mileage, which may be taxed as part of the costs in the case.</p>

Action to recover damages sustained on account of personal injuries received by plaintiff from having been thrown, with his horse and sleigh, from an embankment used for public travel at the crossing of a highway over defendant’s railroad. It is alleged that the embankment was a part of the railroad crossing and was not in good condition and safe for travel at the time plaintiff was injured. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff; defendant appeals.

This action is brought upon a policy of insurance to recover for a loss sustained by the burning of the insured property. The court rendered judgment for plaintiff upon a demurrer to the answer of the defendant, from which the latter appeals. Had there been no loss, the company would have been entitled to the premium, and had the loss occurred while the premium was over due and unpaid, defendant would not have been liable.

This plaintiff in bis petition states that tlie defendant is a corporation under tlie laws of Iowa, engaged in tlie business of a common carrier of freight and passengers along its line of railroad, through Linn county, Iowa; that “ on a day in 1872, the plaintiff was in the employment of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company as a switchman, at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and it became his duty as such to switch and couple and uncouple all the cars of both the Chicago &…

This is an action in equity- to restrain the defendants from collecting the taxes assessed upon the property of plaintiffs, to pay the expense of grading, macadamizing and improving Third street in the city of Dubuque, upon which street the property of plaintiffs in question abuts. On the 10th day of January, 1873, a temporary writ of injunction was issued, as prayed in the petition, and upon the final hearing the same was made perpetual. The defendants appeal.

Action to quiet and establish the title to certain land situated in Cerro Gordo county, which is described in the petition. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

On the 29th day of April, 1875, the plaintiff presented her petition to the lion.

In January, 1872, the plaintiff filed his petition in the District Court, alleging that he is the absolute owner of the real estate therein described; that the same was conveyed to him by Henry Crawford, November 1, 1871; that Henry Crawford theretofore was the owner of said land by patent title from the United States, issued February, 1870.

This action is brought to recover for breaches of a certain bond made by the defendants in words and figures as follows: “State oe Iowa, Jasper County, ss: “An order having been made on the 14th day of June, 1874, by E. W. Mitchell, justice of the peace of said county, that O. S. Geddis be held to give security to keep the peace, and especially toward George Fry, Mary Fry, and Delia Fry, in the sum of five hundred dollars: Now, therefore, we, C. S. Geddis as principal, and…

In the first count of the petition plaintiff alleges that on the 30th day of September, 1870, he went upon the defendant’s cars at Grand Junction to go to Moingona; that the conductor informed him the train did not stop at that place, but agreed that he would check the speed of the train at Moingona so that plaintiff could safely get off, and that plaintiff relied upon this promise and leaped from the train and was injured; that the conductor failed to check the speed, and…

The •plaintiff brings this action against the defendant, a physician and surgeon, for malpractice in the .treatment of Hannah Mewhirter, plaintiff’s wife, during her confinement giving birth to a child, whereby it is alleged she has sustained serio.us-injuries and been permanently disabled in body. • The petition among other things states that the plaintiff has been compelled to pay out and expend large sums of money in caring for and doctoring his wife and has been, and…

This is a controversy respecting the priority of right and title to a certain lot and building thereon in Hamburg. The plaintiff claims title under a mortgage foreclosure sale, and . the defendant under a mechanic’s lien foreclosure sale. The plaintiff, asserting his title as paramount, brings this suit in ■equity to enjoin the defendants from receiving a sheriff’s deed and from asserting any title under their purchase; and asks that his' title be .quieted.

The plaintiff’ alleges in liis petition that on or about the 20th day of March, 1875, he and the defendant entered into a verbal contract, whereby the defendant agreed that he would sell to the plaintiff and cause to be conveyed to him, by good and sufficient warranty deed, certain real estate situated in Dallas county, Iowa, particularly described. The price of the premises, and the terms of payment, etc., are also set out.

This action was brought before a justice of the peace to recover $92.00, as justly due plaintiff as damages for injuring and destroying a cow belonging to plaintiff, and for feeding and taking care of her from the time of injury to the time of her death.

The petition in substance alleges that in the year 1871 the defendant, a duly incoi’poi’ated city, constmicted a culvert on Case street, near the plaintiff’s pi’emises, in such a careless and inipi’oper manner that it obstructed the flow of a natural stream of water running near plaintiff’s premises, and caused large quantities of water to be dischai’ged thex-eon, damaging and depreciatiixg his property to the extent of $500.

This is an action to recover for damages alleged to have been sustained on account of being precipitated over a set7off in a sidewalk of defendant, which, it is alleged, was left in a dangerous condition and not sufficiently guarded by barriers or railing. The defendant denies the allegation of the petition and alleges that plaintiff was out late at night in a state of intoxication, and that whatever injuries he sustained resulted from his own carelessness and negligence.

On the 8th day of August, A. D. 1871, one D. G. Board-man purchased of one Westcott certain real estate in the town of Albia, and on that day entered into possession of the same, and continued to occupy said premises as his homestead until the 8th day of October, A. D. 1872, when he exchanged the same for the premises in controversy, and immediately entered into possession of the latter, and occupied the same as his homestead until the 20th day of July, 1874, when he sold…

The defendant, William Crum, as treasurer of the board of trustees of the State University of Iowa, executed to the plaintiff, King, a contract whereby he agreed to sell and convey with special warranty to said King certain land. King paid a portion of the purchase money and assigned his contract to the plaintiff, Weary, who also paid a portion of the purchase money. Afterwards it was adjudged that the land was the property of one Page.

Francis W. Crane & Co. brought an action in the District Court of Floyd county against F. P. Woodbury, appellant, alleging in their petition that Woodbury w&,s a non-resident of Iowa. Service of the original notice was had by publication. Judgment by default was rendered. The action was aided by attachment, and 160 acres of land in said county, were levied upon.

Elsa D. Weaver and Hannah P. Grates, sisters, bring this action, in chancery to set aside a deed, executed by them, conveying a quarter section of land in Black Hawk county, and to remove certain other clouds from their title and quiet it in themselves.

<p> Appeal from Worth District Oowrt. </p> <p>The plaintiff is the owner of the patent title to one hundred and sixty acres of improved land in Worth county, and is in possession thereof. The defendants claim the land by virtue of four tax deeds executed to them by the treasurer of Worth county, pursuant to an alleged sale of the lands on the 12th day of June, 1865, for the delinquent taxes of the years 1859, 1860,1861, 1862 and 1863.</p> <p>The plaintiff brings this action to quiet his title, and offers to reimburse defendants for any payments made by them on account of the taxes due on the land described.</p> <p>The court rendered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. The facts appear in the opinion.</p> <p>The counties possess the right to sell property for taxes only by virtue of express grant and their powers therein are to be construed strictly. (Blackw. on Tax Titles, 2 ed., 33, 34; Ham v. Miller,.’A) Iowa, 450.) The county authorities must follow the statutory method of conducting tax sales or their acts are void. (Blackw. on Tax Titles, 34.) The treasurer can only sell for delinquent taxes at public sale, and a fixed time' and place after due notice. (Rev., § 763.) The deeds are void because the sale was made upon an unauthorized day, without opportunity for competition, and because it was made in eighty-acre tracts, while the assessment was in forties, to unknown owners. (Blackw., 396; Dudley v. Tuttle, 3 Hammond, 504; 1 Story’s Eq., § 293.) The execution and delivery of the deed do not bar appellant from showing that the premises were not in fact sold for the taxes delinquent thereon. {Case v. Abel, 28 Iowa, 280; Thomas v. Stickle, 32 Id., 78.) The right to assess and collect taxes wdll not by implication include the right to sell property for such delinquent tax. (Ham v. Miller, 20 Iowa, 453.) Parties are presumed to intend the necessary and legal consequences of their acts. (Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall., 48; Cwaning ham v. Freeborn, 12 Wendell, 240; Waterbury v. Sturtevant, 18 Id., 353.)</p> <p>The tax deeds are conclusive evidence that the adjournments were as provided by law and that the sales were regular, after proper notice. (Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; MoCready v. Sexton, 29 Id., 356.) They are also conclusive that each forty-acre tract was offered and sold separately. (Rima v. Cowan, 31 Iowa, 125; Bulhley v. Callanan, 32 Id., 461.) The deed is conclusive that the sale as conducted as recited therein. (MoCready v. Sexton, supra; Ware v. Little, 35 Iowa, 234.)</p>

Avpeal from, Muscatine Circuit Court. This action was commenced in October, 1873, to restrain the defendant from filling up to high water marlt fractional, block number one, as designated upon the plat of South Muscatine, and situated near the water line of the Mississippi river. On the 11th day of November, 1873, a temporary injunction was granted, as prayed.

Action for specific performance. The petition states that James Ashton departed this life intestate, on the 27th day of September, A. D. 1873, leaving as his heirs-at-law the defendant, Hannah Ashton, his widow, and her two children, William Ashton and Margaret Tnlley, and two children by a previous wife, and that on the 30th day of September, A. H. 1873, the following agreement was entered into between the plaintiffs and Hannah and William Ashton: “Mattoon, 111., Sept.…

On the first of Jnne, 1874, plaintiffs commenced an action against David Clark in the Dubuque Circuit Court, and procured the issuance of a writ of attachment.

Plaintiff alleges in his petition that he was the owner of a certain cow, which casually strayed upon the track of defendant’s road. That said defendant by its agents and servants did run and manage one of their engines in such a grossly negligent and careless manner, that the same ran against and over said cow and hilled her.

This action is brought for the purpose of obtaining judgment for work and labor performed by plaintiff, in grading and improving the streets of the city. When a statute does not in express terms annul a power given to a corporation under a former act, but confers some right or powers under a new name, and with additional powers, such additional act does not annul the rights given under the former act. (Dill, on Mun.

Action to recover the price and value of a certain mare that was killed by a team belonging to the defendant running away and against said mare. Trial by jury. Yerdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

In October, 1872, the appellants petitioned tbe board of supervisors of Clarke county to establish a certain road. On the 29th of April, 1873, the plaintiff filed his claim for damages in the amount of $260.00.

The plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of this State, and is doing business at the city of Waverly, in Bremer county. For the year 1874 it was assessed by the city assessor in the sum of $9,000. The city council of Waverly, being the board of equalization under Code, § 829, increased this assessment to $20,000. Subsequently the plaintiff appeared before the board and made application to correct the assessment and increase thereof.

The plaintiff is the owner of one-sixteenth of the water power owned by the parties in common. And the only question before the court is, whether there can be a partition of such property, and if so, whether it is practicable. At common law partition between tenants in common of real property is a matter of right.

Action on two promissory notes, for $121.66 each, made by J. M. Griffin and John A. Townsend, dated September 12, 1870, one payable January 1, 1872, and the other January 1, 1873, with interest at ten per cent payable annually, and payable to S. O. Marsh. A jury was waived and there was trial by the court. The following conclusions of fact and law were found: “1. The notes in suit were given for personal property bought of plaintiff by defendant, Griffin. “ 2.

<p>1. Criminal Law: municipal corporation: ordinance. Where a city ordinance is enacted to promote the public peace, safety and convenience and provides for a penalty of a fine, the violation of the' ordinance is a public offense, and the guilty party is liable to a criminal prosecution.</p> <p>2. Jurisdiction: justice op the peace: mayor.' Under the Code the jurisdiction of mayors of cities and incorporated towns over persons guilty of violations of municipal ordinances is not exclusive, and a justice of the peace may issue a warrant for the arrest of one charged with such offense, and detain him in custody until the day of trial.</p> <p>3. Criminal Law: city ordinance. A city ordinance requiring the marshal to “take up any cow or cattle running at large,” includes also the idea of confining such animals and any one releasing them without authority is guilty of a violation of the ordinance.</p>

Action to recover lands. ■ The cause was sent to a referee, who, with the evidence, reported findings of fact and law in favor of plaintiff. Before final judgment the defendant filed his petition, supported by affidavits, praying for a new trial oh the ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was overruled, and judgment rendered upon the report of the referee. Defendant appeals.

March 9, 1869, defendant presented to the clerk of the court a receipt acknowledging satisfaction in full of the judg-ment, purporting to be signed by William Wymore, as attorney in fact for Benjamin Smith. . Upon presentation of this receipt the clerk marked the judgment satisfied. The petition alleges that the entry was erroneous, and that the judgment has never been satisfied.

Action at law. A demurrer to the petition was sustained. From this ruling plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion. Money for redemption having been voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts, no right of action arises for such payment.

The plaintiff, Dean, is a judgment creditor of the defendant, Skinner. After the contracting of the debt, but before the rendition of the judgment, Skinner sold and conveyed certain land to his co-defendant, Edna A. Hall. Execution was issued upon the judgment and a return made that no property was found to satisfy it.

Tuts is an action to recover damages for the killing of two cows and a two-year old steer.

AjpjpeMl from Winneshielc District Court. On the 20th day of February, 1878, three general executions were issued on judgments of the Winneshiek District Court, against the defendant, S. O. Wilson. E. E. Cooley, the plaintiff in this action, was attorney for the plaintiffs in execution, and caused the executions to issue, and gave the sheriff directions to levy on the -defendant’s store and lot.

Action to recover damages sustained by the destruction of property by fire set out and permitted to escape by defendant. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff; defendant appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion. The civil liability, if any, arises from a violation of sections 3889 and 3890 of the Code'.

Wapello Circuit Court. Edward D. White, a resident of Louisiana, died in the year 1871. At the time of his death and for many years prior thereto, he was the owner of 200 acres of land in Wapello county in this State. He owned no other property in Iowa,- and the record in this case shows that no claims were made against his estate, excepting one preferred by his brother, Daniel White.

TnE defendant was indicted for the crime of receiving and aiding in concealing stolen goods.

Action on account for legal services. The defendant is a city of the second class, incorporated under the general incorporation laws of Iowa. The plaintiff was elected and qualified as its city solicitor. He performed the services sued for, and they were reasonably worth the amount claimed. Other facts are stated in the opinion. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Action for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff or defendant has the better title to the real estate described in petition. A deed executed simply for the purpose of giving security should be treated as a mortgage.

The petition alleges that in August, 1874, the defendants owned and operated a threshing machine in a careless, negligent and unlawful manner, by permitting the tumbling- rods in close proximity to those employed thereabouts to be unprotected, exposed and unsafe; that plaintiff was there rightfully employed at and about said machine and seeing its condition and how it was operated, and, although using due care and diligence and without any fault on his part, was by reason of…

Action in chancery to foreclose a mortgage. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff, from which defendants appeal. The facts of the case appear in the opinion. In equity an offer and a willingness coupled with the ability to pay the money are all that are necessary where at law an absolute, unconditional tender of the money would be required.

The petition alleges that Dunning was the owner of a certain newspaper, known as the “Jackson Oounty leader,” and leased his office and all that pertained thereto to Elliott, and at the same time sold and transferred to him the claims and accounts growing out of the publication of said paper.

The plaintiff, Bridget McTighe, avers that she is the owner of the middle one-third and the south one-third of lot No. 2, in block No. 36, in the city of Des Moines, and also 160 acres of land (describing it) in Polk county; that defendant, as sheriff of Polk county, has levied an execution upon said property issued upon a judgment against her husband, Michael McTighe, and has advertised the said property for sale. She prays for an injunction restraining the sale.

The petition alleges in substance that, on the 13th clay of September, 1873, S. W. Williams recovered a judgment for the sum of $3,371.66, and costs, and a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage upon lot number one, in block number nine, in Bayliss’ First Addition to the City of Council Bluffs, and an order that so much thereof as might be necessary be sold under special execution to satisfy said judgment.

The plaintiff petitions foi’ dower of one-tliird in fee simple of all the lands of which her husband, R. O. Kendall, died seized. The appellants, A. O. Dodge and others, by leave of the court filed their petition of intervention, claiming that said Dodge recovered a judgment against the administrator of the estate of Kendall for $7,635.53, which was still unsatisfied, and that the other intervenors were creditors of the estate in certain stated sums.

This is an action in equity, in which the plaintiff claims of defendant the sum of $1991.40 and interest, an alleged balance due upon account for pianos, and asks that two certain deeds be treated as mortgages and foreclosed, alleging that defendant caused said deeds to be executed to plaintiff as security for the sum claimed.

Eepdeyin for two heifers. The cause was submitted to the court without a jury upon an agreed statement of facts, and a judgment was rendered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

This action is founded on five promissory notes made by defendant, payable to tbe order of McKinney, Potter & Co., and indorsed by them to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that each of said notes was indorsed and transferred to them by the payees before the maturity thereof.

The plaintiffs filed their petition alleging that, as a co-partnership, on the 10th day of March, 1874, they obtained a judgment for one thousand and twenty-one dollars against the National Coal and Mining Company, and caused execution to be issued thereon on the 7th day of October, 1874; that the sheriff, not finding any property belonging to said National Coal and Mining Company on which to levy, requested C. C. Blake, last acting president of said company, to point out…

The plaintiff, as guardian for Nancy Richardson and James R. Richardson, Jr., commenced an action against A. Longman, as administrator of Thomas Richardson, deceased, for money and property received by Thomas Richardson in his lifetime as guardian of the said Nancy and James R. Richardson and not accounted for.' On the 30th day of October, 1873, the cause was referred to E. Brannan.

The petition states that the plaintiff was elected city solicitor of the city of Waverly, and was qualified as such and discharged the duties of the office; that the city assessor in his official capacity requested of the plaintiff as city solicitor a written legal ojfinion necessary in the performance of his official duties; that .the plaintiff gave him an official written opinion which was reasonably worth the sum of ten dollars, for which he claims judgment.

This action is brought to recover possession of specific personal property. The usual averments are made in the petition. The alleged cause of the detention of the property is that the defendant seized and took possession thereof under and by virtue of an execution issued by the clerk o*f the Circuit Court of Lee county on a judgment rendered in said court, which is alleged to be absolutely void.

' The defendants and one A. E. Knott, one F. L. Knott undone ~W. II. Goudy, were doing business as partners under the name of The Mt. Yernon Grain Company. The said firm’ purchased of plaintiff certain corn, and delivered to him a memorandum or ticket in the following words: “Weighed on Fairbanks’ Standard Scales. 79. Weighed at Mill, 1872. Load of Corn, 30. From J. J. Smith, To Knotts & Goudy. $697.25. Net 235J 10-100 bush.

Plaintiffs, as trustees, for certain bondholders, secured by a deed of trust upon the Des Moines Yalley Eailroad, procured a decree of foreclosure tliereon in this action, upon which an execution was issued and the road, with appurtenant property* was offered for sale and struck off’ upon the bid of the Keokuk & Northwestern Railroad Company.

Action in chancery to enjoin tbe collection of certain taxes levied by the common council of the city of Council Bluffs. The defendants are the mayor and members of the city council and the treasurer of the county. The plaintiffs are the owners of certain real estate in the city of Council Bluffs, which is subject to the taxes' in question. The District Court by decree granted the relief prayed for in plaintiffs’ petition. Defendants appeal.

. ■ Action to recover the difference in price of certain real estate sold by plaintiff at auction, which defendant refused to pay for and which was resold. Defense: statute of frauds. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The statute of frauds was not intended to cover a sale made under a decree of court, and such sale is not within the statute. (Borer on Jud. Sales, § 129; Fulton v. Moore, 25 Pa.

Action at law. Thepetition alleges that defendant is charged with the duty of keeping in’ repair the streets within its limits, and that for years it knowingly left a part of Main street out of repair so that it was impossible for travelers to pass therefrom to another street which connects with a highway leading to plaintiff’s ferry across the Des Moines river at Port Eichmond, about one-third of a mile from Ottumwa, whereby the travel was diverted from plaintiff’s ferry,…

County warrants were issued in favor of the defendant, E. H. Kimball, who was county recorder, for the amount of three hundred dollars. The account or claim was presented to the board of supervisors and allowed by them, but there was no recorded vote of the board allowing the claim, as required by Sec. 321 of the Code.

Two actions in replevin to obtain possession of cattle belonging to the plaintiffs respectively.

Plaintefp, who is a married woman, brought this action to recover for personal injuries sustained through the negligence of defendant’s servants, while she was a passenger in one of its cars. There was a verdict and judgment for plain tiff. Defendant appeals. The husband is liable for the torts of the wife. ('McElfresh, v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, 224; Luse v. Oaks, Id., 562.) The husband is a'necessary party with' the wife in an action for the slander of the wife. (Endersv.

Action upon a contract between the parties, whereby plaintiff was employed to teach a school in the defendant district.The petition alleges that although plaintiff was qualified, ready and willing to perform lii-s contract at tbe time therein prescribed, defendant refused to permit him to perform it and prevented him teaching the school.

The agreed abstract shows the following facts: The plaintiff filed before a justice of the peace of Butler county, as evidence of his claim against defendant, a promissory note executed by her, upon which there was due at the date of the judgment $18.12. Notice was issued and-the return day was fixed on the 20th day of April, 1874.

The plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant,. Scott, and thereon garnished the C., B. & Q. E. Co. A judgment was rendered against the garnishee, from which plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

The petition states that E. E. Gay, one of the defendants, in 1869 made his note to the plaintiff and executed a mortgage to secure the same on his homestead; that said notéis due and unpaid, and that defendants and all other citizens of Burlington well knew that the property mortgaged had been the homestead of said Gay ever since A. D. 1856.

On the 11th day of April, A. I). 1874, George Keenan recovered a judgment against John Kenefick,'which on the same day was assigned to plaintiff, but such assignment was not filed with the clerk of the court in which it was rendered until after the garnishee proceeding hereafter mentioned was served on Kenefick.

This action is brought to recover damages caused the plaintiff by reason of his slipping and falling down, owing' to the negligence of the defendant in not having the sidewalk cleared from accumulations of ice and snow. Defendant appeals, and assigns as error the giving and refusing to give certain instructions. The giving of an instruction based upon an assumption not sustained by the evidence is erroneous.

On the 31st day of March, 1875, judgment was rendered •against the defendants for $212.00, and attorney’s fees and costs. • On the 6th day of April, 1875, the defendants filed their motion, supported by affidavits, to set aside the default, which motion was overruled. Defendants appeal. The material facts.are stated in the opinion.

Tms action was brought on an account before a justice of the peace of Bonaparte township, Van Burén county, Iowa. The defendant resided in Lee county. He appeared and showed by an affidavit that he resided in Lee county, and moved for a change of venue to that county. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant then withdrew from the case and the plaintiff toot judgment.

The petition states that tbe plaintiff was a passenger on a train on the defendant’s road, and that through the negligence and fault of the employes of defendant he was greatly injured and damaged in the sum of ten thousand dollars. The answer consisted of a general denial. The jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of four thousand dollars. Defendant appeals and now insists that the damages were excessive and the instructions erroneous.

On the 11th day of December, A. D. 1872, the defendant executed his negotiable promissory note payable to the order of H. M. Crittenden, cashier, and to secure the same executed a mortgage on his homestead and left both with Crittenden or the Waterloo Savings Bank, of which Crittenden was cashier.

<p> Appeal from Floyd Circuit Court. </p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

This is an action upon a written lease for rent. Defendant answered, setting up a counter-claim for board of servant girl fifty weeks, $200.

On the 4th of March, 1873, the plaintiff filed his amended petition, in substance stating that on the 13th day of August, 1870, he sold to the defendant, R. F. McGrew, one hundred and sixty acres of laud for $1,600.; that McGrew delivered to plaintiff at the date of the purchase of said land a promissory note, executed to said McGrew by one Solomon Ritter, for the sum of $1,102, which note was secured by mortgage on a large amount of land that had been sold and conveyed by…

The plaintiff sent to the Bank of Bed Oak a note executed by Henry Lee & Co., and guaranteed by J. F. Somes & Oo. for collection. The latter firm was composed of J. F. Somes and H. A. McFatrich, and Moore was president of the bank, which no longer has an existence; the defendants, Moore & Oo., being its successors in the business, but whether they were liable for the delinquencies of the bank was a controverted point.

On the 29th day of September, 1869, John Oussick and Owen Rooney entered into a written contract by which Oussick agreed to sell to Rooney a tract of land, the contract being conditioned, in the event of the failure by Rooney t.o comply with it, that he was to pay a penalty of five hundred dollars. Rooney failed to comply with the contract, and bn the 14th day of April, 1870, Cussick commenced an action, by the service of the original notice, for the recovery of the penalty.

This is an action to recover the sum .of $218.87, an alleged balance due for lumber sold to defendant. The defendant, by way of counter-claim, alleges that he made a contract of purchase of plaintiff’s lumber yard in Washington, Iowa, for which he was to pay Washington prices, with 12 per cent off. That it was agreed at the time of purchase that plaintiff should add no lumber to the stock then in the yard.

Action to recover certain land situated in Wapello county. The plaintiffs claim title to the property under a decree had in the United States District Court, in a cause wherein Wilson and Hall were plaintiffs, and Harriet Harrow and others, widow and heirs of Francis M. Harrow, then deceased, were defendants. The defendants in this action claim title under a conveyance executed by Francis M. Harrow, prior to the proceedings and decree in the United States Court.

The plaintiff lield a promissory note for $500, executed jointly by the defendants and one Jolm W. Griffith. After the note became due Griffith made a payment on the note of $409.65, and within four months thereafter- was adjudged a bankrupt on the petition of creditors other than, the plaintiff. After the adjudication in bankruptcy the defendants, Poague and Wood, paid to the plaintiff’s, clerk (who was ignorant of the circumstances), the balance of the note and took it up.

Plaintiff claims to recover on several counts for work and labor done, money loaned, and on a promissory note. The petition shows that the promissory note covers the same demands set up in the counts of the petition for the other causes of action, and claims to recover but once on each separate cause of action, either upon the count of the note or upon the other counts. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Jacob Eeichard made a contract with the defendant to erect certain buildings. ITe had on hand considerable material, and was largely indebted to his mechanics, among whom was the plaintiff. Being unable to pay, his workmen refused to work any more unless what was due them was either paid or secured.

This is an action against Jester Hedge and ¥m. Heaton, upon a judgment of the District Court of Polk County, rendered in 1859 against a partnership under the name of Hedge & Heaton.

The plaintiff is a minor residing with the defendant in the county of Clayton and 10th Judicial District. . Hannah M. ’Thompson, the mother of the plaintiff, resides in the county of Floyd aud 12th Judicial- District.

The plaintiffs, who are the chilch’en of Austin Jacobs, deceased, bring this action for the partition of certain real estate of which the said Austin Jacobs died seized, alleging that said decedent and Anna Jacobs, his widow, prior to their marriage entered into an agreement whereby the said Anna relinquished her right of dower.

On the 23d day of January, 1875, plaintiff filed in the Oar-roll Circuit Court an amended petition, in substance alleging that on the 30th day of August, 1869, being the first day of the August Term of the Oarroll Circuit Court, J. E. Griffith obtained a judgment against plaintiff for the sum of $6,920 and costs; that Griffith, in obtaining this judgment practised fraud; that in 1869, Isaac Hampton was president, and John Moore was secretary of the district township of…

The petition states that plaintiffs are residents of the city of Burlington, and. that said city is in debt over and above the constitutional limit; that a certain street tax levy has been made by the city authorities which is illegal and void, and that certain contracts have been made by the city for grading certain named streets and an indebtedness thereby incurred over and beyond the current revenues of the city, and that the same is therefore illegal and void; that the…

This is a proceeding of certiorari; the defendants are the members of the board of supervisors and the auditor of Marion county. The petition alleges that the board of supervisors acted illegally and exceeded its power in correcting an assessment for taxation for the year 1873, made upen certain shares of stock in a National Bank owned by plaintiff.

On the 28th day of January, 1868, J. G. IToplrinson, being the owner of 200 acres of land in Iowa county, executed a mortgage thereon to the State-University for $400; and March 9,1868, he executed another mortgage on the same land to S. C. Tofts, plaintiff herein, to secure $840 and interest. On the 28th day of November, 1868, ITopkinson conveyed forty acres of said land to Perry ITopkinson.

The plaintiff filed a petition in two counts, in each claiming judgment for $746, the amount of a bond 'for $500, and the coupons due thereon, executed by defendant to Foster Brothers or order, and by them indorsed in blank.

This is an action for tlie possession of lots three, 'four, five and six in block one, in the city of Keokuk, and the land lying in front of said lots, extending from the front line of said lots to the Mississippi river, the full width of said lots.

Wapello District Court. The plaintiffs, Daniel O’Brien and John O’Brien, allege in their petition that William- Strang (named in the petition as defendant but not served with notice, so far as the record shows) is their guardian, appointed by the county court of Wapello county, and that the defendants, John Shea and E. E. Coday, are sureties upon his guardian bond.

This is an action for the possession of a certain forty acres of land, of which plaintiff alleges he is the owner. The answer denies that plaintiff owns the land, and alleges that defendant is the owner thereof.

On the 15th day of January, 1873, the plaintiff, Mrs. P. E. Drake, entered into a contract with the defendant, Vorse, whereby she agreed to manufacture for him all the school seat castings that he should w’ant dxvring the year 1873, Vorse furnishing the patterns.

Indictment for obstructing a highway. The District Court refused to permit Elias King to testify before the jury for the alleged reason that the minutes of his testimony had not been returned by the grand jury with the indictment to the court. The State appeals.

Action to recover damages caused by reason of tbe defective condition of the sidewalks in said city. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

The petition in this case avers that on the 3rd day of May, 1870, defendants made their promissory note, payable to the order of John Wilson, for $1,433.33, due in two years, upon which is the following indorsement: “For value received, I hereby assign the within note to Gr. C. Paramore. “ May 16, 1871. [Signed] John Wilson.” That said note was given for part of the purchase money for certain real estate.

This is an action in equity to restrain tbe defendant from collecting an assessment upon an abutting lot for the purpose of defraying the expense of curbing, guttering and macadamizing the street fronting the same. A preliminary injunction was granted October 23,1873, and upon the final hearing, July 13,1875, the injunction was made perpetual. Defendants appeal. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Action in chancery to establish and quiet the title of certain lands in plaintiffs. Upon a hearing on the merits a decree was entered dismissing plaintiffs’ petition, from which they appeal. The onus is upon the subsequent purchaser to show that he made his purchase in good faith and for a valuable consideration.

This is an agreed case, and the only question presented in ' the record involves the right of the City of Burlington to-license hotels and taverns kept within its limits. There was a judgment in the court below for defendant. Plaintiff ap-

The averments of the petition substantially are: That in May, 1865, there was a settlement had between plaintiff and Daniel Mendenhall, deceased, in which there was a mistake, and that Mendenhall knew of this mistake, and fraudulently concealed it, and accepted the money paid him by plaintiff, who did not know of the mistake and fraud until October, A. D. 1874. This action was commenced in December, 1874, to recover the amount paid by him through said mistake.

Action to recover damages for the alleged killing of William Lang, by reason of the negligence of the employes of defendant in running a train of cars over the said Lang, and thereby causing his death. Jury trial, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Plaintiff must allege in his petition and prove care on the part of her decedent, as well as negligence on the part of defendant, to entitle her to recover.

An agreed case to test the authority of the city of Bur7 lington to license billiard tables used within its limits. There was a judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

App&d from Mahaska District Court. Tiie petition in substance alleges that defendant is, and- for more than a year past has been, a corporation duly organized, owning and operating the Central Eailroad of Iowa from Albia in Monroe county to Mason City in Cerro Gordo county, and that Eddyville, Given Station and Oskaloosa, are stations north of Albia on said road.

Action to foreclose a mortgage executed by John and Jane McKee to secure certain promissory notes made by E. A. McKee. The petition, in addition to the foreclosure of the mortgage, asks judgment against the maker of the notes. A decree was entered dismissing the petition as to John and Jane McKee, and granting the relief asked against the other deffendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Action upon a promissory note against the makers and indorsers thereof, and to foreclose a mortgage securing the note. The cause was submitted to the court without a jury, and, upon the facts found, which were reduced to writing and filed, a judgment was rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Defendant was clerk of the District and Circuit Courts of said county.; and plaintiff claims that as such he received large sums of money as fees in excess of his salary, which he has converted to his own rise. Defendant, by way of counterclaim, alleges that plaintiff is indebted to him for services performed. Trial to the court. Judgment for costs in favor of defendant. Doth parties appeal.

The facts disclosed by the record in. this case are substantially as follows: Dominick Black purchased of the plaintiff Wetherell certain lands, and received a bond for a deed, upon the condition of the payment' of certain notes executed for the purchase price. ■ On the 31st day of December, 1867, Dominick Black conveyed all his interest in said lands to his two minor sons, Peter and Charles Edward Black, and authorized them to procure a deed therefor.

Action upon a bond given by B. E. Allen, who had been appointed agent to receive swamp land money for said Einggold county from the State Treasurer, as principal, with F. E. West as surety. The penalty of the bond was thirty-five thousand dollars; the amount the plaintiff claimed was $16,737.62, with interest from July 27, 1867; and the jury upon the trial found a verdict for plaintiff for $8,168.82, with interest as claimed. The defendants appeal.

The petition alleges that at a sale made on the 6th day of July, 1869, by.

This action is brought upon two promissory notes made by the defendant to the plaintiff, one dated April 18, 1872, for $860, with interest and reasonable attorney’s fee. if collected by suit, payable nine months from date; and the other dated November 13, 1872, for $225, with interest and attorney's fee, etc. The defendant answered, alleging in substance that the first note for $860, dated April 18, 1872, has been fully satisfied and paid, in that the same was included in a…

The plaintiff and defendant are brothers in law. Plaintiff claims of defendant $249.00, on account for hoarding furnished, and doctors’ bills paid for defendant’s daughter. The defendant denies the indebtedness, and by way of cross-demand claims $1,384.50, for the labor of this daughter and a son, each for the period of nine years. There was a jury trial, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff for $5.00. Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was overruled.

Action on a policy of insurance. The answer among other things alleges: 1st. The building, when insured, was used as a dwelling, and the risk was increased by putting in a stock of furniture and cabinet shop. 2d. That there were two mortgages on the insured property at the time of the insurance, which continued to the time of the loss.