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42 La. 934

State v. Patterson

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Decided October 15, 1890

Supreme Court of Louisiana · decided 1890-10-15

Hieles, J. 1. An exception to an entire charge which points out no specific errors, but asserts generally that it did not properly inform the jury of the law of the case, and that the charge is not law, is too vague to be considered by the Supreme Court. It is the duty of counsel to point out each erroneous instruction specifically,and bring it to the attention of the court, so the court can pass upon it.

Decided 1890-10-15

¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

Watkins, J.

¶2The indictment charges that the accused “ did wilfully and feloniously, by force and violence, rob from the person of Ered. Sims a watch worth $16,” etc.

¶3Having been tried and convicted, his counsel filed a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the indictment was defective and insufficient to support a conviction, because ‘ ‘ it does not charge him with robbing the said Sims of the watch and chain against his will."

¶4The District Judge disallowed the motion, because he regarded as sufficient the averment of the indictment that the watch and chain were taken from the prosecutor “by force and violence." He says that while it is true that ‘ ‘ an indictment (for robbing) must state upon its face that the goods were taken against the will of the party assaulted, (yet) it seems (that) it may be good without the use of those specific words, if the words used convey the same meaning.”

¶5It is well settled that an indictment for robbery must set out, in substance, all the elements of that crime as a common law offence.

¶6Such an indictment should state the crime as having been committed feloniously, violently and against the will, or by putting the person in fear.

¶7An essential element of larceny is stealth, and that of robbery is force. The latter may be physically ’applied to the person robbed, or goods may be extorted from Mm by the employment of intimidation or putting him in fear. But manifestly either physical violence or intimidation implies a restraint of volition, nothing else; and the *936addition of the phrase “ against his will” would have 'been an unnecessary tautology instead of a requisite element of description.

¶8The use of force, or putting in fear, are terms to be employed in alternative only. The indictment must allege either force or putting in fear. 2 Bishop, Orim. PL, Sec. 1005.

¶9We do not understand that a contrary doctrine is announced in State vs. Durbin, 20 An. 408, or in State vs. Cook, 20 An. 145. In the former it was said that “ in an indictment for robbery from the person, the words feloniously, violently and against the will are essential; and it is usual, though it seems to be unnecessary, to allege a putting in fear.” The words “violently and against the will” are not more expressive than are the words “by force and violence.”

¶10In the latter case it was said that at common law the crime of robbery “ consists in the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, of any chattel, money or valuable security, to any value, by violence or putting him in fear.”

¶11That is, doubtless, a correct definition of the crime of robbery, but the opinion in that case does not state that this identical phraseology is essential to the validity of an indictment. On the contrary, it is apparent that the felonious and forcible taking of goods or property of another against his will is to be accomplished “ by violence or putting him in fear.” So that an averment in an indictment that the goods were taken by force and violence necessarily implies that they were taken against his will.

¶12Our conclusion, therefó're, is that the indictment is not defective or insufficient.

¶13Judgment affirmed.

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