Donawitz v. Danek’s Empirical Analysis
1977
Citation profile
12 federal appellate · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 36 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2018 · most notably Rush v. Savchuk (1980), Belcher v. Government Employees Insurance (1978)
12 federal appellate · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred accruing within or without the state.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[cjontrary to the implication in the majority opinion, we have never said that Seider was, in fact, a judicially created direct action statute. The statements to which the majority alludes were made in response to arguments that Seider represented an arrogation of legislative responsibility. We specifically noted in Seider that the direct action analogy was a limited one and that jurisdiction was obtained because the policy obligation to defend and indemnify should be considered a debt owed to the insured by the insurer. (Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114 , 216 N.E.2d 312, 315 , 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 , supra; see, also, Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311 , 234 N.E.2d 669 , 672, 284 N.Y.S.2d 633 , 637, supra.) Judicial creation of a direct action statute is a contradiction in terms. Courts do not, or at least should not, legislate.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[T]he Legislature did attempt to enact a “direct action” statute, in lieu of Seider , but the proposed enactment was vetoed by the Governor. (See Governor’s veto message, N.Y. Legis.Ann., 1973, p. 349.) Since the Legislature would have repealed Seider but for the Governor’s veto (which was based on a drafting deficiency and not upon the merits of the legislation), the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature is “satisfied with it” [366] N.E.2d p. [256] [397] N.Y.S.2d p. [595] is simply untenable. But, in any case, it is my view that a court may, and should, rectify prior error in statutory interpretation and should not place the burden upon the Legislature to redraft the statute.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.