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42 Tex. 496

Sylvester v. State

Texas Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1874

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1874-07-01

Tried below before the Hon. Samuel Dodge. Mary Sylvester was indicted for keeping “ a disorderly “ house, for the purpose of public prostitution, and as a com- “ mon resort for prostitutes.” On the trial, witness Drew testified that he knew the defendant, and her residence, in 1874; knew the general character and reputation of defendant to be that of keeping an assignation house—that he liad been at the house of defendant, and had met one woman there for a lascivious purpose.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1874-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently November 1944

3 state decisions

3018741880189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Gould, J.

¶1The case of Morris v. The State (38 Texas, 603), recognizes the admissibility of evidence of the general reputa*497tion of a house for the purpose of establishing its character as a house of prostitution. The admissibility of such evidence is supported by decisions of other courts. (See The State v. McDonell, Dudley, S. C., 346; The State v. Hurd, 7 Iowa, 412.) Wharton says: Common reputation of the character of “ the defendants, and the house which they kept, and of the “ persons visiting them, is admissible.” (3 Wharton’s Am. Cr. Law, Section 2393.) It is believed to be well settled that the character of the occupants may be established by evidence of their general reputation. (2 Bish. Cr. Pr., Section 93.) Whilst it is true that.the admissibility of such evidence as to the house is denied by some authorities (see Com. v. Stewart, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 342), we see no sufficient reason for departing from the ruling in Morris -y. The State.

¶2The case before us does not present the question of the sufficiency of such evidence, alone, to support a conviction. One witness testifies not only that the house was so reputed, but proceeds to state facts which show that he knew the base uses to which it was appropriated. Whatever doubt we might entertain of the sufficiency of evidence of the general reputation of the house, unsupported by other testimonjq to justify a conviction, we think the additional facts in evidence in this case were sufficient.

¶3A distinction is made, in the argument of counsel, between an assignation -house and a house of prostitution. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we think the jury were justified in inferring that the use of the house as an assignation house was by common prostitutes.

¶4There was some evidence on behalf of defendant, to the effect that she lived a quiet, peaceable life, and that there was no noise or disturbance at her house. This may have been true, and yet the house have been “ disorderly,” in the meaning of the law. A house of prostitution is within the Act, however quietly and peaceably it may be kept.

¶5The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.

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