¶1Appellants brought this action for specific performance of the agreement hereinafter set forth. After hearing appellants’ evidence, the district court, upon motion of all the respondents, granted a nonsuit and entered judgment dismissing the action, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
¶2The pleadings are very voluminous; but, in view of the course of the proceedings and the result reached in the district court, we do not deem it necessary to set them forth. Nor is it deemed necessary to refer at length to the evidence adduced at the trial. We shall, however, refer to such parts of the pleadings and evidence, in the course of the opinion, as we may deem necessary to afford a full understanding of the points decided. The material parts of the agreement declared on are as follows:
“Salt Lake City, Utah, October 5, 1901. This agreement, made and entered into between Horace H. Cummings and Barbara M. Cummings, his wife, first part, and1 Christian Nielson and Sarah E. Nielson, his wife, second part, all of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, witnesseth: That the said second party hereby sells and conveys to the first party all their right, title and interest in the Cummings-Nielson Co. represented by fourteen shares of the capital stock (one share of their original investment having been *162sold to James Nielson) and also to give an option on all their or either of their interest in the estate of Julian Moses, deceased, or refusal to purchase the same at a price as low as any other bona fide offer for it or any portion of it, for tbe sum of five hundred eighty ($580) cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and four hundred thirty ($430) within six months from date hereof. The said second party s shall also see that the ten shares of stock which is now held as security of certain payments to be made to Euth Moses shall be liberated before the said second, payment is made. In consideration of the transfer of stock and the fulfilling of the aforesaid covenants and conditions, the first party agrees to make the payments as aforesaid.” (Italics ours.)
¶3The agreement was signed by all the parties named therein. It was either admitted by respondents, or proved by appellants at the hearing, that the appellant B. M. Cummings and the respondent Sarah E. Nielson and one Esther B. Swain are sisters and children of the Julian Moses, deceased, named in the agreement aforesaid, and were the sole heirs of his estate, subject, however, to a life estate of one Euth Eidge Moses, who was the surviving widow of said Julian Moses, deceased, and the mother of said three sisters; that the appellant Horace H. Cummings is the husband of the appellant B. M. Cummings, and the respondent Christian Nielson is the husband of the respondent Sarah E. Nielson; that on the 11th day of July, 1908, the respondents Christian and Sarah E. Nielson sold their interest in the estate of said Julian Moses, deceased, to Eorest N. Stillman, and the other respondent was made a. party merely as the wife of said Forest N. Stillman; that the Niel-sons sold their said interest and conveyed the same by proper deed of conveyance to said Forest N. Stillman for the sum of $3,000; that said sale was made without the knowledge or consent of appellants, and that said Stillman purchased with full knowledge of the agreement aforesaid and of appellants’ Tights; that appellants always were ready, willing, and able to pay, and, according to their testimony, are “now (at the time *163of trial) able, ready, and willing to pay into this court (district court), or to sucb person as tbis court may adjudge, tbe sum of $3,000, or any larger sum that any other bona fide purchaser would have paid for this property at the time of the sale to Mr. Stillman on July 11, 1908.” The' property mentioned' in the agreement as the estate of Julian Moses, deceased, was fully identified in the pleadings and by the evidence at the trial.
¶4It was also shown, through correspondence and conversations had between the parties to the contract, after the sale of the interest aforesaid, that all the parties to the agreement fully understood its meaning and' general purport, and that the transaction between the Nielsons and Stillman was entered into, not because of the grounds now urged as heref-inafter stated, but because the Nielsons insisted that the appellants did not want the property, or had waived their right to the same, or for some similar reason. When appellants had made proof of such matters as were denied and not admitted in the answers, all of the respondents made a motion for a nonsuit upon the following grounds:
“(1) That the offer or option, as contained1 in Exhibit A introduced herein as the basis for this action, is unfair, unreasonable, and unconscionable. (2) That the same is uncertain as to description of property, as to price and as to the time within which it may be accepted, and as to all other matters and elements. (3) That any offer contained in said instrument, Exhibit A, has never been accepted by the plaintiffs or either of them, .and for the further reason that there has not been a tender to comply with the terms thereof, or to pay any price thereunder. (4) The plaintiffs have not brought themselves within any of the equitable rules entitling them to the specific performance of the contract, if any, here in question.”
¶5In granting the motion, the court said:
“The motion will be sustained on the grounds set forth by defendants’ attorneys in their motion for nonsuit and dismissal.”
¶6*164It is thus made apparent upon wbat grounds the court granted the nonsuit. It is manifest that both the rulings and the motion are based entirely upon the language contained in the agreement, and1 not because of any evidence adduced, or for lack of evidence. We, therefore, need not discuss the evidence.
¶7Taking up respondents’ objections in the order stated in the motion for nonsuit, we first inquire, What, if anything, makes the agreement “unfair, unreasonable, and unconscionable,” as contended for by counsel ? Counsel, in referring to this point in their brief, say:
“Appellants, according to the language used, are entitled to buy the property without any time limit being fixed either for the ascertainment of the price or for. the purchase of the property at a price as low as anyone else may in good faith offer for it. The offer is not to sell a,t the highest price offered in good faith by another person, but in fact the offer is to sell at the lowest price that might be offered in good faith by another person. In other words, if a person in good faith offered to buy the property from the Nielsons for one dollar at any time while the property existed, even though the Nielsons did not care to sell at that price, the appellants would be entitled1, under the letter of this option, to come in and buy the property for that sum. This is highly unfair and inequitable.”
¶8It is quite apparent that whether counsel’s contentions are sound or not hinges upon the meaning to be given to the language of the agreement which we have italicized. Giving the language found in the agreement its ordinary and usual meaning when applied to the subject-matter and nature of the agreement and apparent object or purpose of the parties, as must be done, what was their intention as the same is ascertained from the language found1 in the agreement ? In our judgment it is quite clear that, in addition to the sale of the corporate stock mentioned in the agreement, it also contained an option in favor of appellants in which they were given the right or option to purchase certain interest in certain real estate.
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“Since a contract is to be construed as a whole, terms which, can he inferred from a consideration of the entire instrument are as much a part of the contract as if expressly set forth therein.” 2 Page on Contracts, sec. 1118.
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¶13Nor is tbe contention sound that tbe agreement is unfair because no time limit was fixed for tbe “ascertainment of tbe price” for tbe sale of tbe property. Here, again, no time limit was necessary, and no precise price could1 well have been fixed under the circumstances. Tbe parties, however, provided a method by which tbe price could be fixed; and, unless and until tbe Nielsons were ready and willing to sell, it was quite unnecessary to fix a price; and, when they were ready and willing to sell, then all they were required to do was to sell to appellants for as low a price as they were willing to sell the property to anyone else. There is nothing unfair or unjust about such a provision. If tbe property increased in value after tbe contract was entered into, tbe Nielsons would obtain tbe benefit of tbe increase; and, if tbe value or price declined, they were not bound to sell at any price to appellants unless willing to sell to another. All tbe Nielsons were bound to do under tbe terms of tbe contract was to give tbe appellants a reasonable opportunity to exercise tbe option to purchase, for which they bad paid- a valuable consideration.
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¶18Finally, the fourth and last ground of objection, namely, that appellants have not “brought themselves within any of the equitable mies entitling them to a specific performance of the contract,” is entirely too indefinite to require discussion. In our judgment, the contract in question, when fairly construed, is not vulnerable to the objections urged against it by the respondents. We also are of the opinion that appellants have made out a prima facie case, and are entitled to a decree of specific performance of the contract, unless some facts are shown which overcome their prima facia *170case. The district court should therefore proceed to hear the defenses set up by respondents in their answers, and make findings of facts and conclusions of law upon all of the issues presented by the pleadings, and enter a judgment or decree in accordance therewith.
¶19For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court, with directions to overrule the motion for nonsuit and to grant appellants a new trial, and to proceed with the case in accordance with the views herein expressed. Appellants to recover costs on appeal.