Hunter v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Thus, any post-appeal sentence imposed in a Davis-type case may not exceed the sentence originally imposed for the conviction which remains, if the defendant has begun to serve the sentence. Any ruling to the contrary in the Davis opinion is abandoned.” (Emphasis added).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Fullman v. State · White v. State

2. ““We are not convinced that Whalen controls the instant case in view of the ambiguities contained therein which we find in unexplained conflict with prior double jeopardy principles which we thought settled. We are unwilling to abandon those principles until the United States Supreme Court has more clearly and definitely abandoned them.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Quinonez · Hunter v. State

3. ““Before reaching the substance of the matter, we are compelled to note that increasing uncertainty exists in this area of the law, resulting from the somewhat ambiguous and to us, at least, puzzling pronouncements in recent United States Supreme Court cases. Compare Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 , 98 S.Ct. 909 , 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 , 100 S.Ct. 1432 , 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 , 100 S.Ct. 1747 , 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980). We are not alone in this posture. See e. g., People v. Hughes, 85 Mich.App. 674 , 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978); Western & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Supreme Court Rev. 81, 113. We thought the Supreme Court cases, and quotations therefrom, cited in the foregoing opinion in this case, constituted settled law on the subject of double jeopardy. But the Court’s recent majority decision in Whalen seems to have added a new and, perhaps, contrary analysis structure to cumulative punishment cases without any attempt to clarify, distinguish, or overrule its prior decisions upon the basis of which the foregoing opinion was formulated. It is within this vacuum that we are asked to decide the effect of Whalen on the instant case. “We distinguish Whalen . That case concluded that Congress had not intended to punish doubly for the crimes of rape and felony murder. Thus, the analysis stopped with the determination that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had exceeded its”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Hunter v. State