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← 420 F.2d 1327 - United States v. Bryant

United States v. Bryant’s Empirical Analysis

420 F.2d 1327 · 1969

Citation profile

104
cited by 104 later decisions
5
states following
October 2016
most recently cited

68 federal appellate · 30 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 104 later decisions — most recently October 2016 · most notably United States v. Benn (1972), United States v. Gambrill (1971)

68 federal appellate · 30 state decisions

840196919701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Morissette v. United States · Weiler v. United States · Patterson v. Medberry · Austin v. United States · Wood v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 104 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “.. . [W]e note specifically that we are not ruling that the defendant would be entitled to that portion of the charges which requires a “purpose to disobey or disregard the law.” Similar wording is contained in the Seventh Circuit’s Manual on Jury Instructions-Criminal, § 4.04, 33 F.R.D. 523 , 550 (1963). But the supporting citations show that it is drawn from cases involving crimes where the intent to break the law may be critical-e. g., a tax evasion case, where fraud is at issue, see Elwert v. United States, 231 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1956), or a case involving unlawful conversion of Government property, where the defendant claims that he thought the property involved had been abandoned, see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).. Generally, in cases of attempt or assault with intent to commit a substantive crime, the required specific intent is simply “an intent to commit a specific crime,” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 73 (12th ed. 1967). As for the specific intent in assault with intent to commit rape, “the man’s purpose must be to use force, should it be necessary, to overcome the woman’s will.” 1 Bishop’s Criminal Law § 731.5 (9th ed. 1923). New if any cases of attempted rape will turn not only on intent to do the act, but also on questions of law, and existence of intent to break the law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “. . . be sent to the jury with instructions making clear that a guilty verdict may not be based solely on complainant’s testimony, even assuming that her account and demeanor appear convincing. The jury must also be told that corroboration of the complainant’s testimony is essential, and that it is their responsibility as jurors to determine whether evidence which they credit establishes such corroboration. [Citations omitted.] [United States v. Bryant, 137 U.S.App. D.C. 124, 128, 420 F.2d 1327, 1331 (1969).]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““With respect to crimes such as charged in this case, specific intent must be proved before there can be a conviction. “Specific intent, as the term itself suggests, requires more than a mere general intent to engage in certain conduct. “A person who knowingly does an act which the law forbids, or knowingly fails to do an act which the law requires, intending with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law, may be found to act with specific intent.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.