Evans v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kranz v. State · Reger v. Washington County Board of Education

2. “[Generally, criminal statutes must contain language that criminalizes the forbidden act, as well as a provision that penalizes the behavior. 7 This proposition, as hornbook law, is succinctly stated by Wayne R. LaFave in the 2010 edition of one of our oft-quoted tomes: “[A] crime is made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a prescribed penalty. The former without the latter is no crime. The modern criminal penalties are: the death penalty, imprisonment with or without hard labor, and the fine. In many cases the section of the statute that describes the forbidden conduct concludes with a statement of the punishment; or perhaps one section sets forth the forbidden conduct and the next section the punishment.” See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 438, 450 , 639 A.2d 675, 680, 685 (1994), in which we reversed a trial court’s application of a mandatory ten-year penalty for drug offenders that “previously [have] been convicted” of similar offenses to an offender who had been convicted of a drug offense after the conviction of the principal offense. In so doing, we relied on the fundamental principle that “criminal statutes [must] be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable and what the penalty for such conduct might be before the criminal conduct is committed.” When a statute, as the instant one, fails to internally contain a penalty provision, its ability to criminalize conduct becomes more complicated. LaFave is of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. State

3. “§ 444. Obliterating, etc., identification mark or number. It shall be unlawful for anyone to obliterate, remove, change or alter the manufacturer’s identification mark or number on any firearms. Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or have had possession of any such firearms, such fact shall be presumptive evidence that the defendant obliterated, removed, changed or altered the manufacturer’s identification mark or number. § 444. Restrictions on sale, transfer and possession of pistols and revolvers. (b) Sale or transfer to criminal, fugitive, etc.—A dealer or person may not sell or transfer a pistol or revolver to a person whom he knows or has reasonable cause to believe has been convicted of a crime of violence, or of a violation of any of the provisions of § 286, § 286A, or § 286C of this article, or any conspiracy to commit any crimes established by those sections or of any of the provisions of this subtitle, or is a fugitive from justice, or is a habitual drunkard, or is addicted to or a habitual user of narcotics, barbiturates or amphetamines, or is of unsound mind, or to any person visibly under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or to any person under 21 years of age as required by federal law. (c) Possession by criminal, fugitive, etc.—A Person may not possess a pistol or revolver if the person: (1) Has been convicted of: (1) A crime of violence; or (ii) Any provisions of this subtitle; or (2) Is: (i) A fugitive from justic”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. State