¶1*78MURPHY, J., dissenting, in which HARRELL and ADKINS, JJ., join.
¶2There are two reasons why I dissent from the holding that Petitioners are entitled to a new trial. First, assuming that it is appropriate to reach the “merits,” I would adopt the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals and affirm the judgment of that Court. More importantly, however, this Court should refuse to address the merits of Petitioners’ Rule 4-326(d) argument on the ground that the inaction of Petitioners’ trial counsel—who actually witnessed the alleged violations—utterly failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.
¶3Judge Sweeney’s opinion includes the following factual findings:
Counsel did not expressly agree to any process for handling jury notes or communications. Counsel did observe at various times that notes were coming from the jury foreperson and being given to the judge for consideration. Counsel did not observe all jury notes being handed to the clerk since they were busy with other tasks such as examining or cross-examining witnesses, taking notes, or, in the case of the parties with more than one attorney, counsel may have been absent from the courtroom preparing an upcoming -witness or handling other matters needing attention outside of the courtroom. At no time did counsel object to the process by which Judge Mitchell was handling jury notes throughout the course of the trial or prior to the verdict being reached.
The clerk was keeping the jury notes as part of the record in the case. At any time, counsel in the case could have reviewed any or all of the jury notes that the judge had returned to the clerk. There is no evidence that any of the counsel asked to review the notes in the possession of the clerk.
Jury Note 12, which clearly was fully disclosed on the record, is not at issue as not being disclosed. However, Appellants have placed emphasis on this note with the *79suggestion that it was being “hidden” by Judge Mitchell and only revealed when one of the attorneys, Mr. Panteleakis, noticed it at the bench while they were discussing Jury Note 11 and asked Judge Mitchell about it. Mr. Panteleakis stated he received “a stern look” from Judge Mitchell upon making the inquiry.
Judge Mitchell testified that he was not trying to hide any notes, and this is credible to the Court. He was instead going to get to the note when he chose to do so—not on counsel’s schedule. He was preempted by counsel’s arguably presumptuous inquiry and then fully disclosed Note 12 to counsel. This incident does show that all defense counsel were aware at that juncture that at least some jury notes were being handled in a fashion that did not totally suit them.
¶4(Emphasis supplied).
¶5As Judge Sweeney noted, at the point in time when Jury Notes 11 and 12 were discussed at a bench conference, Petitioners’ trial counsel were on actual notice of how Judge Mitchell had been handling jury notes that were being (1) written in the jury box, and (2) passed to him in open court. At this point in the trial, Petitioners’ trial counsel had a full and fair opportunity to make whatever objections they wished to make. It is clear, however, that Petitioners’ trial counsel neither made any objection nor requested (1) to review any of the notes that had already come out of the jury box, or (2) the opportunity to review, from that point forward, any note that would come out of the jury box during the remainder of the trial. Under these circumstances, this Court should hold that Petitioners’ right to review notes coming out of the jury box was waived.
¶6In Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516, 60 A.2d 216 (1948), this Court stated:
This Court has recently held in Conley v. Warden of the Maryland House of Correction, 190 Md. 750, 59 A.2d 684 [ (1948) ], as follows: “... ‘Where in a State criminal trial the defendant is represented by competent and experi*80enced counsel, even constitutional rights known or presumed to be known to counsel to exist must be held to have been waived if not made at all or … inadequately presented.’ United States ex rel. Jackson v. Brady, 47 F.Supp. 362, 367 [ (1942) ], aff. 4 Cir., 133 F.2d 476, cert. den. 319 U.S. 746, 63 S.Ct. 1029, 87 L.Ed. 1702, rehearing denied 319 U.S. 784, 63 S.Ct. 1315, 87 L.Ed. 1727 [ (1943) ].” Had the objection been seasonably made in the case at bar, the omission could have been readily corrected.
¶7Id. at 526-27, 60 A.2d at 220-21. (Emphasis supplied). Those statements are fully applicable to the case at bar. This Court should not reverse Petitioners’ convictions on the ground that the trial judge—in open court—employed a procedure that “could have been readily corrected” at the request of Petitioners’ counsel.
¶8Judges HARRELL and ADKINS have authorized me to state that they join this dissenting opinion.