421 Pa. Super. 33 - Whyte v. Robinson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

99 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 99 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “clearly and palpably abused its discretion or committed an error of law which affected the outcome of the case.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 305 - Rohe, K. v. Vinson, D. and Felton Welding · 2017 Pa. Super. 64 - Vetter, J. and Jones, A. v. Miller, A.

2. “[E]vidence tending to establish intoxication on the part of a pedestrian is inadmissible unless such evidence proves unfitness to be crossing the street. Pennsylvania courts have gone to great lengths to enforce [the analogous rule relating to the intoxication of drivers]. Consequently, no reference should be made to a pedestrian's use of alcohol unless there is evidence of intoxication or copious drinking on the part of the pedestrian; for example evidence that the injured party was staggering or had liquor on his breath gives support to such an inference.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kuna v. Lake Sheridan Cottagers Ass'n · Kraus v. Taylor

3. ““Applying McKee [by McKee v. Evans, 380 Pa. Super. 120 , 551 A.2d 260 (1988)] to the facts herein, we are mindful that none of the defense witnesses, who opined Whyte was drunk, observed Whyte prior to the accident. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence such as staggering, stumbling, aimless wandering, glassy eyes or incoherent mumbling. See e.g., Ackerman v. Delcomico, 336 Pa. Super. 569 , 486 A.2d 410 (1984) (corroborated testimony that a party had been heavily drinking prior to accident, whose breath emitted a strong odor of beer, whose speech was slurred and whose alertness was unusually low after the accident was held to be much more than a suggestion of intoxication and was properly admitted into evidence); Hannon v. City of Philadelphia, 138 Pa. Commw. 166 , 587 A.2d 845 (1991) (holding that the combined evidence of an admission to drinking more than a six-pack of beer, the use of abusive and foul language, screaming, loud and uncooperative behavior, smell of alcohol, incoherence and rambling, repeatedly ripping off a cervical collar after being warned of the dire consequences, and slurred speech was admissible). The tension in this case is between the relevance of the evidence and its prejudicial effects. We conclude, therefore, that even if remotely helpful, the lay opinion of Robinson and his companions as to Whyte’s intoxication was manifestly prejudicial and should not have been admitted into evidence. "Id. at 41, 617 A.2d at 384 . (emphasis added)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kuna v. Lake Sheridan Cottagers Ass'n