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421 So. 2d 188

Hall v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided October 22, 1982

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1982-10-22

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently November 1999

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“We now hold that a probationer, upon a specific request and at periodic intervals, may be required to identify himself and provide all necessary information for his supervision including the place of his residence and his employment. He may also be required to confirm or deny his location at a particular place at a particular time, to explain his noncriminal conduct, and to permit the search of his person and quarters by the supervisor. Failure to do so may itself be grounds for revocation or [sic] probation. His agreement to accept the terms of probation effectively waives his Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to this information. There would be no practical means to properly supervise an individual on probation without a requirement that the probationer respond to directions and requests for information from the probation supervisor. On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be applicable to specific conduct and circumstances concerning a separate criminal offense.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 452 So. 2d 611 - Hooper v. State

Relies on 399 So. 2d 1137 - Vey v. Bradford Union Guidance Clinic, Inc. · 343 So. 2d 13 - State v. Heath · Dearing v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-10-22

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

SCHEB, Judge.

¶1Appellant Hall challenges the trial court’s revocation of his probation. He contends the court erred in requiring him to testify, over his objection, as to his having been convicted and sentenced for certain crimes committed after he was placed on probation. Hall argues that the requirement that he testify violated his constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

¶2We reject appellant’s contention. In Dearing v. State, 388 So.2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), cert. denied, 399 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1981), the court held that a probationer has no privilege against self-incrimination with respect to an offense he committed after being placed on probation, and for which he could not be subsequently prosecuted. We agree.

¶3We reject appellant’s reliance on Meehan v. State, 397 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), where we held that during the course of habitual offender proceedings the defendant could not be required to testify that he had been previously convicted of other crimes. There, we reasoned that the sentence enhancement proceedings were sufficiently related to the criminal trial as to require the application of the rule that the defendant cannot be forced to convict himself by his own testimony. However, there is no prohibition against requiring a probationer to testify in a revocation proceeding, subject to his privilege against self-incrimination with respect to specific conduct and circumstances concerning a separate criminal offense. State v. Heath, 343 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1977). In the instant case, the appellant cannot be subsequently prosecuted by virtue of having been forced to - testify as to his previous convictions. Therefore, Meehan has no application to this case, and we affirm the revocation of Hall’s probation.

¶4Affirmed.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
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