Briscoe v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The principle that emerges from Davis is that operation of the exclusionary rule is suspended only when the evidence seized was the result of a search that, when conducted, was a “police practice” specifically authorized by the jurisdiction’s precedent in which the officer operates. To decide whether the particular search at issue in the present case—the search of the locked glove compartment—comes within the Davis rule, we must examine what Maryland law dictated at the time of that search. The search of Petitioner’s vehicle was conducted on June 26, 2007. At that time, the search of the minivan incident to Petitioner’s arrest was governed by the then-prevailing Belton bright-line rule. See Gee, 291 Md. at 668 , 435 A.2d at 1389-90; McCain, 194 Md.App. at 276, 4 A.3d at 66. Under Belton , a glove compartment is included in the Belton perimeter. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 n. 4 [ 101 S.Ct. 2860 ]. At the time of the search at issue, no reported decision of this Court or the Court of Special Appeals had addressed specifically whether a police officer conducting a Belton search could open a locked glove compartment. Petitioner takes the position that, because, at the time of the search at issue, no reported decision in Maryland expressly authorized police to open a locked glove compartment as part of a Belton search, there did not exist at that time “binding appellate” Maryland authority upon which Officer Bormanshinov could have “reasonably relied” in searching the glove compar”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States v. Debruhl · Kelly v. State

2. “In reviewing the ruling of the suppression court, we must rely solely upon the record developed at the suppression hearing. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148 [ 12 A.3d 1238 ] (2011). We view the evidence and inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party who prevails on the motion, id., here, the State. We give deference to the first-level factual findings made by the suppression court, and we accept those findings unless shown to be clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Elliott v. State, 417 Md. 413, 427 [ 10 A.3d 761 ] (2010). We, however, make an independent appraisal of the constitutionality of a search, “applying the law to the facts found in each particular case.” Id. at 428 [ 10 A.3d 761 ] (quoting Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 120 [ 981 A.2d 1247 ] (2009)) (internal quotation mark omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 219 Md. App. 91 - Scribner v. State

3. “The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment [of an automobile] are rarely “within the area into which an arrestee might reach,” and blind adherence to Belton’s faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 219 Md. App. 91 - Scribner v. State