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422 So. 2d 1024

Docket No. AL-286.

Daniels v. State

Archie DANIELS and Michael Dunn, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided November 30, 1982.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1982-11-30

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently December 1992

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Charging theft and dealing in stolen property. — Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 538 So. 2d 1296 - Stallworth v. State

Relies on 408 So. 2d 224 - Hudson v. State · 391 So. 2d 725 - Coley v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-11-30

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Michael Allen, Public Defender, Tallahassee, and Brandt W. Davis, Asst. Public Defender, Apalachicola, for appellants.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Richard A. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4Defendants appeal their judgments and sentences for dealing in stolen property. They contend that § 812.025, Fla. Stat. precludes them from being charged and tried in Franklin County for dealing in stolen property when they had been previously charged and convicted in Gulf County of grand theft involving the same property. We agree and reverse.

¶5The defendants stole a television set in Gulf County, and sold it in Franklin County.[1] The defendants were charged in Franklin County with dealing in stolen property. They had been previously charged and convicted in Gulf County for grand theft involving the same television set which they sold in Franklin County. The state does not contest the fact that the offenses arose out of the same scheme and course of conduct. Defendants contend that pursuant to § 812.025 they cannot be convicted of both dealing in stolen property and of grand theft of the same property.

¶6Section 812.025 provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts. (emphasis added).

¶7Section 812.025 clearly prohibits a conviction of both crimes if charged in the same information and there is no reason for a different interpretation merely because the defendants here were charged in separate informations in separate counties. Hudson v. State,408 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). There is no reason why a person cannot be convicted of theft of property and also be guilty of dealing in the same stolen property in the absence of the prohibition in *1025 § 812.025. See Coley v. State,391 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, the legislature has seen fit to prohibit the conviction of both theft and of dealing in the same stolen property and it is the prerogative of the legislature and not this court to make any change.

¶8The defendants' Franklin County convictions and sentences for dealing in stolen property are reversed.

¶9ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and SHIVERS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶10[1] Although appellants in their brief say two television sets were involved and the state does not contest this fact, the record indicates only one television set was stolen and sold.

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