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423 F.2d 621

Docket No. 22258.

United States v. Johnson

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Jan. 9, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1970.

Certiorari Denied April 27, 1970.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1970-01-09

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently October 1970

3 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 7237

Relies on Minor v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1970-01-09

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¶1See 90 S.Ct. 1500.

¶2*622Burton Marks (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., Jack K. Berman, Eugene W. Doyle, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

¶3John Bartko, Asst. U. S. Atty., Cecil F. Poole, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

¶4Before JOHNSEN * BROWNING, and CARTER, Circuit Judges.

¶6PER CURIAM:

¶7Defendant was convicted on four counts of an indictment alleging four separate sales of heroin in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 4705(a). He contends that the statute is unconstitutional because, as applied to him, it violated the privilege against self-incrimination, and because it is not reasonably related to the taxing authority conferred on Congress by the Constitution. The legislation was sustained in the face of these constitutional attacks by the decision in Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 90 S.Ct. 284, 24 L.Ed.2d 283 (1969), for which this appeal was held.

¶8Defendant’s only remaining contention is that the conduct of the government in making three additional purchases of heroin from him after the initial purchase and in basing additional counts of the indictment on those transactions, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

¶9In determining sentence the trial court was entitled to consider defendant’s personal attitude toward his offense as reflected in his willingness to engage in repeated sales of narcotics, and no other use was made of the series of sales in this case. The minimum sentence required by the statute (five years) was not increased by the multiplication of counts, and the cumulative sentence imposed by the court (fifteen years) was less than the maximum (twenty years) which the court could have imposed on a single count charging a single sale. 26 U.S.C. § 7237(b).

¶10Affirmed.

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