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← 423 F.3d 606 - Balmer v. HCA, Inc.

Balmer v. HCA, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

423 F.3d 606 · 2005

Citation profile

57
cited by 57 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
March 2024
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 57 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2024 · most notably Fox v. Vice (2011), Fox v. Vice (2011)

13 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

290200520102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Equal Pay Act of 1963) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 706 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Griggs v. Duke Power Co. · Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · Corning Glass Works v. Brennan · Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which the jury could “reasonably reject [the defendants’] explanation” and infer that the defendants “intentionally discriminated” against her. Woythal v. Tex-Tenn Corp., 112 F.3d 243, 246-47 (6th Cir.1997). The plaintiff must submit evidence demonstrating that the employer did not “ ‘honestly believe’ in the proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.” Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Smith v. Chrysler, 155 F.3d 799, 806-07 (6th Cir.1998)). To inquire into the defendant’s “honest belief,” the court looks to whether the employer can establish “reasonable reliance” on the particularized facts that were before the employer when the de cisión was made. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Section [3730(h) ] provides relief only if the whistleblower can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s retaliatory action resulted ‘because’ of the whistleblower’s participation in a protected activity. Under other Federal whistleblower statutes, the ‘because’ standard has developed into a two-pronged approach. One, the whistle-blower must show the employer had knowledge the employee engaged in ‘protected activity’ and two, the retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s engaging in protected activity. Once these elements have been satisfied, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove affirmatively that the same decision would have been made even if the employee had not engaged in protected activity.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “If there is no reasonable dispute that the employer made a “reasonably informed and considered decision” that demonstrates an “honest belief’ in the proffered reason for the adverse employment action, the case should be dismissed since no reasonable juror could find that the employer’s adverse employment action was pretextual.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.