¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
¶3It cites as the authority for reversing the case on the charge of criminal recklessness, the case of DeVaney v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732. It should be noted that in DeVaneythe appellant had been convicted of both reckless homicide and causing the death of another while intoxicated. This Court only reversed the reckless homicide conviction and allowed the conviction for causing the death of another while driving while under the influence of liquor to stand.
¶4It is obvious in the DeVaneycase that both convictions could not be allowed to stand, as we had a dual conviction for a single offense. Further, the choice was obvious since the appellant had been specifically convicted of causing a death while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. However, in the case at bar, Williams had only been convicted of criminal recklessness.
¶5It would appear there is ample evidence in the record to support a conviction for criminal recklessness, notwithstanding the fact that appellant was intoxicated.
¶6As far as appellant’s statement that he had been driving the truck in the vicinity of the accident, the statement itself can hardly be considered to be crucial in the case inasmuch as the appellant was found asleep behind the wheel of his truck in the vicinity, thus making it obvious to any person concerned that he had in fact been driving in the vicinity. In view of the other evidence in the case, it can hardly be considered to be crucial to his conviction.
¶7My vote, therefore, would be to deny transfer without opinion.
¶8PIVARNIK, J., concurs.