United States v. Carr’s Empirical Analysis
424 F.3d 213 · 2005
Citation profile
25 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 65 later decisions — most recently May 2023 · most notably United States v. Stewart (2006), United States v. Quattrone (2006)
25 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1111 · 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 3553 · 18 U.S.C. § 924 · 21 U.S.C. § 812 (§ 202 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act)
Relies on United States v. Booker · United States v. Olano · Blakely v. Washington · Johnson v. United States · Neder v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We have our doubts, however, as to whether, had the jury agreed unanimously that the government had failed to prove two of the predicate acts beyond a reasonable doubt, without agreeing specifically as to which two had been “not proved,” it should necessarily have reported itself as being at an impasse, rather than returning a verdict of ac- ' quittal for Carr. Hypothetically, for example, the jury could have agreed unanimously that Carr had not committed the first predicate act, murder, but divided on the proof of his guilt as to the second act, robbery, and third act, engaging in a narcotics conspiracy. It would in that case be possible that every juiror voted “not proved” as to two predicate acts, the first one and one of the two others. This is not what happened and the issue is not therefore before us. But by its supplemental instructions, the district court implied that a jury thus divided must report itself at an impasse on the count in question. We are not convinced that, to the contrary, the jury could not under those circumstance properly vote to acquit the defendant. The fact that the jury “must agree unanimously and separately” as to every element of an offense, Richardson [v. United States,] 526 U.S. [813], at 818, 119 S.Ct. 1707 , 143 L.Ed.2d 985 [ (1999) ], in this case two predicate acts, in order to convict may or may not imply that the jury “must agree unanimously and separately” that the government has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt as to two”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Third Element — Unanimity on Racketeering Acts The indictment charges the defendant with commission of [insert number alleged in the indictment] racketeering acts. As I just instructed you, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least two of the racketeering acts recited in the indictment were committed by the defendant within the prescribed time. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree unanimously that at least two particular racketeering acts were committed by the defendant. It is not enough that you all believe that two racketeering acts were committed. That is, you cannot find the defendant guilty if some of you think that only racketeering acts A and B were committed by the defendant and the rest of you think that only acts C and D were committed by the defendant. There must be at least two specific racketeering acts that all of you believe were committed by the defendant in order to convict the defendant.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“as we made clear in considering a virtually identical challenge in United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 950 , 112 S.Ct. 1511 , 117 L.Ed.2d 648 (1992), “the district court did not err in concluding that the most analogous federal offense [to the New York offense of second degree murder] was first degree murder under [18 U.S.C.] § 1111,” id. at 1110. “[T]he absence of reference to premeditation or malice aforethought [in the state law] does not mean that federal first degree murder is not the most analogous federal offense.” United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 , 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Rivera v. United States, 528 U.S. 875 , 120 S.Ct. 181 , 145 L.Ed.2d 153 (1999). We therefore conclude that Carr’s argument in this regard is without merit.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.