Commonwealth v. Sanna’s Empirical Analysis
1997
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 2 district · 116 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 126 later decisions — most recently February 2019 · most notably Commonwealth v. Wilson (1998), Michael Jf Sanna v. Paul Dipaolo (2001)
3 federal appellate · 2 district · 116 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Payton v. New York · Edwards v. Arizona · Colorado v. Spring · New York v. Harris
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 126 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution prohibit warrant- less arrests in the home or warrantless searches and seizures, “absent exigent circumstances or consent.” Commonwealth v. Voisine, 414 Mass. 772, 783 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Derosia, 402 Mass. 284, 286 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 980 (1988). When police seek to justify a warrantless arrest or entry on the basis of consent, the Commonwealth must show “consent unfettered by coercion, express or implied, and also something more than mere ‘acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.’ ’’ Commonwealth v. Voisine, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 555 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 943 (1976). The voluntariness of an individual’s consent to a warrantless entry is an issue of fact, and must be examined in the circumstances of the case. See Commonwealth v. Voisine, supra; Commonwealth v. Harris, 387 Mass. 758, 766 (1982); Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 496 (1976).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[T]he clear error standard is a 'very limited form of review,'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[T]he difference between the elements of the third prong of malice and wanton and reckless conduct amounting to involuntary manslaughter lies in the degree of risk of physical harm that a reasonable person would recognize was created by particular conduct, based on what the defendant knew. For the purposes of third prong malice, the risk is that there was a plain and strong likelihood of death. The risk that will satisfy the standard for wilful and wanton conduct amounting to involuntary manslaughter involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another. Consequently, when it is obvious that the risk of physical harm to the victim created a plain and strong likelihood that death will follow, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter is not required.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.